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Trade, Empires, and SubjectsChina-Africa Trade: A New Fair
Trade Arrangement, or the Third
Scramble for Africa?
Uche Ewelukwa Ofodile*

ABSTRACT

Since 2000, the interest of the People's Republic of China
(China) in Africa has grown steadily. Trade between China and
Africa has grown exponentially. China-Africa trade volume
increased from $10 billion to $18 billion between 2000 and
2003. In 2005, total trade between Africa and China surged to
$40 billion, and in 2006 China-Africa trade was valued at $55.5
billion. A third of China's crude oil imports come from Africa.
In the West, reaction to China's involvement in Africa has
bordered on suspicion and paranoia. Policy makers and
analysts are concerned that China could gain control over
Africa's vast and untapped natural resources. The current
struggle over Africa's resources evokes worrying memories of an
earlier scramble for pieces of the continent. This Article
examines the opportunities and pitfalls that Sino-African trade

* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. S.J.D., Harvard Law
School; L.L.M., Harvard Law School; L.L.M. (International Business Law), University
College London. Fellow, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 20032004. The Author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Asia N. Diggs, a
student at the School of Law, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. Special thanks also
to Anthony Ofodile, Michael Ofodile, and Josh Ofodile for their unflinching support and
encouragement.
There is currently a dearth of systematic data pertaining to China-Africa trade.
Regarding Sino.African trade, a World Bank study recently noted that "there is ... a
paucity of systematic data available ... to carry out rigorous analysis, and from which
inferences.., could be drawn." See Harry Broadman, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND
INDIA'S NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER 3(2007) Ian Taylor, CHINA AND AFRICA:
ENGAGEMENT AND COMPROMISE (2006) (noting that compared to other area studies on
Chinese foreign policy, the study of Sino-African relations has been sparse). Future
articles will draw more readily on systematic data from the economic field as they
become available. The provisions of trade and investment agreements between China
and countries in Africa, as well as the implications of Sino-Africa trade for U.S.
security and energy interests and U.S. foreign policy will be critically evaluated in
future articles.
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relations present for Africa. Instead of paranoia,this Article
calls for guarded optimism regarding the deepening
relationship. While there is much that Africa could gain from
the relationship, African leaders and Africans must guard
against imperialism of any sort and shy away from
arrangements that threaten sustainable development or
undermine respect for human rights. Most important,African
leaders must push past Beijing's rhetoric of anti-hegemonism
and develop clear policies to guide the continent's engagement
with China. Drawing on the rich but sad lessons from the
scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century, African leaders
must avoid the economic, political, and legal pitfalls of the past
and position the continent to benefit from strategic relations
with countries that could become future partners.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2006 was dubbed "China's Year of Africa."' Since 2000,
the People's Republic of China (China) has become increasingly

1.
Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, Behind the Chinese "Year of Africa,"
BUSINESS DAY (S. Afr.), June 21, 2006, available at http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.cal
chinainstitute/navO3.cfm?navO3=47295&navO2=43782&nav0l=43092
(noting that in
Beijing, senior foreign ministry officials call 2006 "China's Year of Africa," and that
this attention is a strong signal that China is "putting down its marker as a serious
player on the continent.").
There may, of course, be little significance to the fact that 2006 was dubbed China's
Year of Africa. Although the international community named 2005 "the year of Africa,"
not much came out of the designation. See World Economic Forum on Africa, Cape
Town, S. Afr., May 31-June 2, 2006, The Year of Africa in Review,
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/SummitReports/africa2006/review.htm (last visited Aug.
12, 2007).
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interested in Africa.2 In October 2000, Africa and China created and
formally launched the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Forum or
FOCAC) to serve as a vehicle for promoting China-Africa friendship
and cooperation.3
During the same month Beijing hosted the
ministerial conference of the Forum (First Ministerial Conference). 4
The first of its kind in the history of China-Africa relations, 5 the First
Ministerial Conference drew over five thousand attendees, including
China's Foreign Minister (Tang Jiaxuan), a representative of China's
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (Shi
Guangsheng), and about eighty ministers of foreign affairs,
international trade, and economic cooperation from forty-four African
countries. 6 Even countries that did not have diplomatic relations
with China, such as Malawi and Liberia, sent observers to the
meeting. 7 Since 2000, several other conferences have been organized.
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia hosted the Second China-Africa Forum on
Cooperation on the 15th and 16th of December 2003. More recently,
the Beijing Summit and Third Ministerial Conference on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (2006 Beijing Summit) took place in November
2006. The Chinese Government issued an African Policy Paper for
the first time in January 2006.8 Since then, Chinese President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have paid friendly visits to at least

2.
HARRY BROADMAN, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA'S NEW ECONOMIC
FRONTIER 1 (2007) (observing that today's scale of China's and India's trade and
investment flow with Africa are "wholly unprecedented"); Leni Wild & David Mephan,
Introduction, in THE NEW SINOSPHERE: CHINA IN AFRICA 1 (Leni Wild & David Mephan
eds., 2006) (observing that although China is not a new player in Africa, "its economic
and political presence on the continent and its impact have grown exponentially in the
last few years.").
3.
Hu Jintao, President, P.R.C., Address at the Opening Ceremony of the
Beijing Summit of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Nov. 4, 2006), available at
http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/04/content_4978.htm [hereinafter President Hu
Jintao's Address] ("Today, the Forum serves as an important platform and effective
mechanism for conducting collective dialogue, exchanging experience in governance
and enhancing mutual trust and cooperation in practical terms between China and
African countries.").
4.
The First Ministerial Conference took place October 10-12, 2000. See
China-Africa Cooperation Forum: Past, Present and Future, CHINA.ORG.CN
http://www.china.org.cn/ englishlfeatures/China-Africa82189.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2008) [hereinafter China-Africa Cooperation Forum].
5.
Beijing Declaration of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, PEOPLE'S
DAILY (P.R.C.), Oct. 12, 2000, http://english.people.com.cn/english/200010/12/
eng2000101252436.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (describing the forum as the first in
the history of China-Africa trade).
6.
China-Africa Cooperation Forum, supranote 4.
7.
Id.
8.
China-Africa
Forum,
China's
African
Policy,
Jan.
2006,
http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-09/20/content_619.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008)
[hereinafter China's African Policy].
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ten African countries. 9 For example, on January 30, 2007, President
Jintao embarked on a twelve-day tour of Africa, his second trip to the
continent in less than a year.' 0
Emerging discourse on the China-Africa relationship depicts
China as either the new imperial power or as Africa's benefactor. 11 In
the West, reaction to China's involvement in Africa has bordered on
suspicion and paranoia. 12 Policymakers and analysts in the West are
concerned that China could gain control over Africa's vast and
untapped natural resources, particularly the continent's energy
reserves. 13 The current struggle over Africa's resources 14 evokes
worrisome memories of earlier scrambles for pieces of the continent
by Western European powers in the late nineteenth century 15 and

China-Africa Forum, China-Africa CooperationFruitful over Past 50 Years,
9.
Nov. 1, 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/01/content_4312.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2008).
10.
Moyiga Nduru, Africa: Oil, Global Influence Driving Hu Jintao's Trip,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/
200701291475.html. The visit took President Hu to Cameroon, Namibia, Mozambique,
the Seychelles, Sudan, South Africa, Zambia, and Liberia. Id. President Hu's African
trips were in February 2004 and April 2006. Hu's Africa-Asia Tour to Bolster
Relations, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international166615.htm
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
11.
See Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Options for the Lion in the Age of the Dragon,
13 S. AFR. J. INT'L AFF. 97 (2006) (providing an example of the discourse depicting
China as a new imperial power or Africa's benefactor).
See id. (observing that paranoia has often characterized recent discourse in
12.
most parts of the world over China's involvement in Africa).
13.
Cyril Widdershoven, Chinese Quest for Crude Increases Focus on Africa,
ENERGY SECURITY, Nov. 15, 2004.
14.
See generally, Joshua Eisenman, Sino-Japanese Oil Rivalry Spills into
Africa, ENERGY SECURITY, Jan. 19, 2006 (discussing the growing competition between
China and Japan for energy resources located in Africa); Katzenellenbogen, supra note
1 ("Because of China's growing access to oil in Africa, its role could help either set off
new, intense power rivalries on the continent, or bring about new forms of constructive
engagement. A new scramble for Africa and its resources is no foregone conclusion, but
the consequences of a scramble would be damaging for the continent."); Widdershoven,
supra note 13 (suggesting a growing conflict between Western and Asian countries as
they seek to outbid each other for key hydrocarbon assets in Africa).
15.
The interest of the imperialist great powers of Europe in the African
continent, particularly in the hitherto unexplored region, experienced resurgence in the
mid-nineteenth century. See Wikipedia, Scramble for Africa, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wikilScramble-for_-Africa (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (explaining that the Scramble for
Africa, also known as the Race for Africa, was the proliferation of conflicting claims to
African territory during the period between the 1880s and 1914). Africa's raw
materials were eyed for their value to Europe's continuing industrialization, and thus
they spurred an intense rivalry and competition for pieces of the continent. The goal of
the Berlin Conference, which met at Berlin from November 1884 to February 1885, was
to stem the intense international rivalry that had developed, resolve competing claims
by European powers and provide for a more orderly division and distribution of the
continent. Id. A European conference attended only by representatives of countries of
Europe (including Turkey and Russia) and the United States, the Berlin Conference
led to the adoption of the Berlin Act of 1885. Id. In all, fourteen countries were
represented at the conference. Id. These included (in alphabetical order): Austria-
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Eastern powers, principally China and Russia, in the 1950s and
1960s.16 China's involvement in Africa has serious implications not
only for Africa and Africans, but also for the security and energy
interests of Africa's traditional trading partners. 17 This Article
examines the opportunities and pitfalls of renewed Sino-African trade
relations, traces the evolution of discourse concerning the ChinaAfrica partnership, identifies the basic legal and policy frameworks of
the unfolding relations, and calls for a clear African policy towards
China. This Article will also seek to identify the core characteristics
of China's partnership with Africa, with an emphasis on the trade
and investment dimensions of Sino-African relations.
Instead of paranoia, this Article calls for guarded optimism
regarding the deepening relationship between Africa and China.

Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway (unified from 1814-1905), Turkey, and the
United States of America. Id.
16.
In Chapter Four of his book titled "The Second Scramble for Africa,"
Emmauel John Hevi describes the competition between China and Russia for Africa in
the 1950s and 1960s. He writes:
One very important aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is how Africa and other
underdeveloped countries are going to be converted to the ideology of those
Eastern imperialists. Note carefully that their arguments do not concern
whether we shall be converted, but only how-- which means that they have
decided for us that we must be converted. The Russians and the Chinese are at
present on divergent paths, and each side is seeking to establish its own camp.
The only question which interests them so far as we are concerned is what part
of Africa will belong to which communist camp. In all African countries where
there are Soviet and Chinese embassies, special local agents are employed to
distribute pamphlets and tracts stating their point of view. On the surface,
this seems a good thing because it appears to assume that we can ... reason
and judge what is best for us. But here also you detect the parallel assumption
that we have to go to one or the other side. Whether we shall remain positively
neutralists, as we have so often and so loudly proclaimed, does not enter into
their dispute.
EMMANUEL JOHN HEVI, THE DRAGON'S EMBRACE: THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND
AFRICA 65-66 (1966). Sadly, the effect of the struggle between China and Russia on
the continent was largely ignored by the warring factions. As Hevi notes:
As if it were not enough for [Africans] to have to cope with the conflicting
policies in Africa of the two great cold war camps, Western and Eastern, there
is the bitter rivalry between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's
Republic. Both rivals are using the African continent as a main arena for their
combat.
Id. at 70.
17.

See generally Ariel Cohen & Rafal Alasa, Africa's Oil and Gas Sector:

Implications for U.S. Policy, in BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.,
No. 2052, July 13, 2007) (noting that the United States
petroleum and 22.5% of the world's natural gas, and that
not recognize the importance of Africa, and in particular
U.S. crude oil imports comes from Africa, compared to
Nigeria alone accounts for 47% of African oil exports).

consumes 25% of the world's
although many Americans do
West African oil, over 18% of
17% from the Persian Gulf.
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With China's confident emergence onto the global stage as the
economic empire of the future, it would be ill-advised for African
leaders to turn their backs on the sleeping giant.1 8 While there is
much that Africa could gain from the relationship, African leaders
and their constituents must guard against imperialism of any sort
and shy away from arrangements that threaten sustainable
development on the continent or undermine respect for human rights
and dignity. Most importantly, African leaders must push past
Beijing's rhetoric of anti-hegemonism and develop clear policies to
guide the continent's engagement with China. Drawing on the rich
but sad history of the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century,
African leaders must avoid the economic, political, and legal pitfalls
of the past and instead position the continent to benefit from strategic
relations with countries that Alpha Oumar Konare, the President of
African Union (AU) Commission, rightly refers to as "partners of the
future." 19
This Article has six parts. Part II maps out the history and
evolution of Sino-African trade and investment relations. 20 Part III
examines the current framework for relations between China and
Africa, including the core documents guiding the unfolding
relationship. Part IV discusses the motivation behind China's foray
into Africa and analyzes China's policy toward Africa. Part V focuses
on the present struggle for control of Africa's energy resources and
draws lessons from the history of the scramble for Africa in the
nineteenth century by the Western European powers.
Part VI
critically appraises Sino-African trade and investment relations. It
evaluates the opportunities that the relationship presents for Africa
and offers proposals for maximizing those opportunities. The Article
concludes in Part VII with a look at the future of Sino-African trade.

II. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF CHINA-AFRICA TRADE RELATIONS

The year 2006 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the onset of
diplomatic relations between China and Africa. 21 However, China's

18.

IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: ENGAGEMENT AND COMPROMISE 1 (2006)

(noting that China has become a major global player).
19.
See Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 103 (indicating that by partners of the
future, he was referring to countries such as China, Brazil, and India); see also
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (observing that India and China, two emerging economic
"giants" of Asia, are at the center of the explosion of African-Asian trade and
investment).
20.
The reason for the focus on trade and investment is that, unlike relations
between China and Africa in the 1950s through the 1970s, see infra Part II, trade and
economic issues now dominate China-Africa interactions. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at
71.
21.
President Hu Jintao's Address, supra note 3.
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contact with the continent existed centuries before.2 2 Indeed, the
idea of a Chinese invasion of Africa is not new. For example, in his
1965 book East Wind Over Africa, John K. Cooley announced, "Red
China has moved into Africa, and it intends to stay there. By the
beginning of this decade, it had become clear that Communist China's
moves to win allies, subvert adversaries[,] and gain influence in
Africa formed a significant part of its design for global recognition
The foundation for China-Africa relations was
and power.123
established at the Asia-African Conference held in Bandung,
Indonesia from April 18 to April 24, 1955.24 Trade agreement
between China and Egypt concluded in August of 1955, shortly after
the end of the Bandung Conference marked "the beginning of
'25
Peking's search for markets and vital raw materials in Africa.
A. The Bandung Conference of 1955 (Bandung I)
Organized by Egypt, Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon
(now Sri Lanka), India, and Pakistan, the stated objectives of the
Bandung Conference (Bandung I) were "to promote Afro-Asian
economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose colonialism or
neocolonialism by the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other
imperialistic nation." 26 Bandung I brought together African and
Asian nationalist leaders for the first time, including such prominent
personalities as Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India; Gamal
Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt; Chou En Lai, Premier of China;
and Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of the Gold Coast (now
Ghana). 27 In all, six African countries sent delegates to Bandung 1.28

22.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that Chinese trade and investment
with Africa dates back several decades); ALAN HUTCHINSON, CHINA'S AFRICAN
REVOLUTION 9 (1976) (observing that although contacts between China and Africa were
few until after 1955, a historical connection linking the two goes back many centuries);
Wild & Mephan, supra note 2, at 1 ("China is not a new player in Africa.").
JOHN K.
23.
OFFENSIVE (1965).

COOLEY,

EAST WIND OVER AFRICA:

RED

CHINA'S AFRICAN

24.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 19 (noting that the Bandung Conference was "a
seminal event" in Sino-African history because it was at this conference that
Communist China first made its tentative links with the African continent); see also
Wikipedia, Asia-African Conference, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandung-Conference
(last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing background information on the Bandung
Conference).
25.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 13 (noting that in 1955, the total volume of
mainland China's trade with Egypt had been only $9 million in Chinese exports to
Egypt and $24 million in Chinese imports from Egypt, but by 1957, the figures had
nearly doubled).
26.
Id.
27.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that the Bandung meeting was the
first opportunity for leaders of the six participating African countries to meet the rulers
of Communist China); Matthew Quest, The Lessons of the Bandung Conference:
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China played a prominent part at Bandung 1.29 Significantly,
several countries were not invited to the conference: South Africa,
30
Israel, South Korea, North Korea, and-most notably-Taiwan.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Five Principles), the
cornerstones of diplomatic relations between China and India, were
endorsed at the conference. 31 Although the Five Principles originally
defined relations between China and India, they eventually became
the principles that would guide the conduct of relations between
China and countries in Africa.3 2 At the conclusion of Bandung I,
attendees adopted a Final Communiqu6, 3 3 which included the
"Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" and the
"Bandung Declaration of 10 Principles. '3 4 Bandung I enhanced the

Reviewing
Richard
Wright's
The
Color
Curtain
40
Years
Later,
http://www.spunk.org/texts/pubs/lr/sp001716fbandung.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
28.
The six countries are Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), Liberia,
Libya, and the Sudan. COOLEY, supra note 23, at 8-9.
29.

Bandung Conference, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2001-07),

available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ba/BandungC.html (noting that China played
a prominent role at the conference).
30.

Id.

31.
The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (The Five Principles) are:
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence. Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.),
June 14, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm.
The Five Principles were featured for the first time in a diplomatic agreement on trade
and communications between the Chinese region of Tibet and India, which was entered
into on April 29, 1954. Id. The Five Principles were officially announced as the basic
norms to guide the Sino-Indian and Sino-Myanmese relations in the "Joint Declaration
of Chinese and Indian Premiers," issued on June 28, 1954, and the "Joint Declaration
of Chinese and Myanmese Premiers," issued on the June 29, 1954. Id. Significantly,
the Sino-Indian joint declaration of June 28, 1954, proposed that "these principles not
only be applicable to relations between nations, but also to the general international
relationship." Id. The Sino-Myanmese joint declaration expressed the hope that "these
principles will be observed by all nations." Id.
32.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 18.
33.
Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indon., Apr. 18-24, 1955, Final
Communiqui of the Asian-African Conference, available at http://www.iss.co.za/Af/
RegOrg/unity-to-union/pdfs/asiaafricabandung55.pdf
[hereinafter
Bandung
Conference].
34.
The Declaration of 10 Principles contains all points in the Five Principles
and, in some respects, extended and developed further the Five Principles. The 10
Principles of the 1955 Bandung Conference are: (1) respect for fundamental human
rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; (2)
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; (3) recognition of the
equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large or small; (4) respect for the
right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the United
Nations Charter; (5) abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs
of another country; (6) abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to
serve the particular interests of any of the big powers; (7) refraining from acts or
threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any country; (8) settlement of all international disputes by peaceful
means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as
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unity of African and Asian countries and laid the foundation for
future cooperation on multiple fronts. 35 Most of the participants at
the conference shared a common history of colonization by Western
States 36 and a common desire to overcome the legacies of colonialism
37
and forge closer ties with one another.
Trade between China and Africa grew following the conference.
Shortly after Bandung I concluded, Chinese officials-headed by
Foreign Trade Minister Yeh Chi-chuang and Vice-Ministers Kiang
38
Ming and Lu Hsu-chuang-embarked on trade missions to Africa.
Between 1955 and 1965, trade between Africa and China increased
nearly sevenfold. 39 The first Chinese trade agreement with an
African country was negotiated in August 1955.40
Diplomatic
relations also deepened during this period.
The first Afro-Asia
People's Solidarity Conference was held in Egypt in 1957.41 Between

other peaceful means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with the United Nations
Charter; (9) promotion of mutual interest and cooperation; and (10) respect for justice
and international obligations. Id.
35.
Quest, supra note 27 (observing that "Bandung clearly helped to forge the
modern identity politics of race, religion, and nationality.").
36.
As Wright aptly described,
The despised, the insulted, the hurt, the dispossessed-in short, the underdogs
of the human race were meeting. Here were class and racial and religious
consciousness on a global scale. Who had thought of organizing such a meeting?
And what had these nations in common? Nothing, it seemed to me, but what
their past relationship to the Western world had made them feel. This meeting
of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon the Western world!
RICHARD WRIGHT, THE COLOR CURTAIN 12 (1994) (emphasis added).
37.
Id. (observing that the Bandung Conference "enhanced the unity and
cooperation of the Asian and African countries, inspired the people to struggle for
national liberation and played a significant role in promoting anti-imperialist and anticolonial struggle of the Asian and African people"); see also supra note 36.
The former Indonesian President Sukarno proclaimed:
For long years we Asian and African people have tolerated decisions made in
our stead by those countries which placed their own interests above all else.
We lived in poverty and humiliation. But tremendous changes have taken
place in the past years. Many peoples and countries have awakened from
centuries of slumber. Tranquility has given way to struggle and action. This
irresistible force is sweeping the two continents.
Zhang Yan, I Wish I Had Met Richard Wright at Bandung in 1995 (Reflections on a
Conference Attended by both Wright and the Author), 50 MISS. Q. 277 (1997).
38.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 13.
39.
Id. (noting that in 1957, the total of all Communist China's commerce with
its African trading partners-Egypt, Algeria, the Union of South Africa, and the Sudan
Republic-was under $60 million, but that by 1965, it had increased nearly sevenfold
and had been extended to nearly all of the thirty-five newly independent states in the
continent).
40.
Under the agreement between China and Egypt, China agreed in the first
year to buy 60,000 tons of Egyptian cotton, and Egypt agreed to buy 60,000 tons of
Chinese rolled steel. HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 15.
41.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 21.
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1960 and 1965, China entered into relations with fourteen newly
independent states in Africa. 42 Despite growing trade relations,
China's interest in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s was ideological
rather than economic. 43 China's relationship with Africa took a
nosedive during the Cultural Revolution in China. 44 However, in the
'45
1970s, China "embarked on an extensive aid programme to Africa.
Between 1970 and 1976, China committed about $1.815 million to
Africa. 46 China also sponsored several prestige projects in Africa
during this period, such as the Tan-Zam railway between Tanzania
and Zambia. 4 7 Africa was also of some help to China during this

42.
China entered into relations with Ghana, Mali, and Somalia in 1960; Zaire
in 1961; Uganda in 1962; Burundi and Kenya in 1963; Benin, Central Africa Republic,
Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Congo in 1964; and Mauritania in 1965. Id. at 23.
43.
The dominant message of communist China during this period was
revolution-revolution against colonialism and imperialism. China thought that it was
on its way to genuine socialist revolution and saw itself as having a role in furthering
this revolution. Id. at 24. China even became a member of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Fund Committee, an organization that met for the first time in Conakry, Guinea in
1991, and had as its aim the provision of support for African liberation organizations.
Id. Cooley has observed that the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism as
interpreted by Mao Tse-Tung was a driving motivation for China's interest in Africa in
the 1950s and 1960s. According to him:
In terms of Communist ideology, the third fundamental aspect of Chinese
foreign policy, Peking's rulers seek to spread their own brand of world
revolution to the exclusion of others. . . . They appear to believe that the
triumph of their model in the "intermediate zone" or "storm centers" of Africa,
Asia, and Latin America is inevitable.... They are willing to do whatever they
can to discredit the other models, as well as to eliminate the "neo-colonialist"
influence of the West to make way for the inevitable victory of the LeninistMaoist faith.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 211. See generally BRUCE LARKIN, CHINA AND AFRICA 19491970 (1971); ALABA OGUNSANWO, CHINA'S POLICY IN AFRICA 1958-1971, at 59 (1974)
(discussing China's effort to influence nationalists' struggles in Africa in the late 1950s
and 1960s and observing that Chinese trade and economic efforts were peripheral to
the overall political objectives during this period).
44.
The Cultural Revolution in China began in 1966 and formally ended at the
Ninth Congress of the CPC in April 1969. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 32-33. Experts
suggest that the Cultural Revolution signified disaster for Beijing's foreign relations
and that China's interest and influence in Africa during this period suffered a major
setback. Id. (observing that China's image was tarnished and its position eroded
internationally during this period and furthermore that all the Chinese embassies in
Africa with the exception of the embassy in Egypt, had their ambassadors recalled).
45.
Id. at 37 (noting that from the end of the Cultural Revolution, nearly half of
China's aid was directed towards Africa).
46.
Id.
47.
A joint statement of intent to build a joint railway was issued by Tanzania
and Zambia in October 1964. Id. The Agreement on the Construction of the TanzaniaZambia Railway was signed by China, Tanzania, and Zambia (the Three Sides) on
September 5, 1967. Id. To fund the project, China agreed to an interest-free loan of
$406 million in July 1970. Id. The loan was to cover construction and rail stock. See
id. at 38 (observing that the TanZam loan was "China's biggest aid commitment to
date" and "the largest single offer of Communist economic assistance ever made").
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period. In particular, Africa was instrumental to China's success in
gaining admission into the United Nations in 1971.48
B. South-South CooperationDiscourse
The "South-South cooperation" discourse is essential to an
49
understanding of the unfolding relations between China and Africa.
Indeed, Sino-African trade partnership discourse is a logical
extension and an example of South-South cooperation. The idea of
South-South cooperation developed right after the Bandung
Conference but began to influence the field of development studies in
the late 1990s. 50 South-South cooperation is fueled by the realization
"that poor nations might find appropriate, low-cost[,] and sustainable
solutions to their problems in other developing countries rather than
in the rich north. '51 Shared concerns about asymmetries of the
international economic order, 52 uneven distribution of the benefits of
globalization, 53 poverty, and social and economic instability caused by

48.
Regarding China's victory in gaining enough votes in favor of its admission
into the United Nations, Taylor notes:
This victory for Beijing was won with the vital support of a number of African
countries. Over a third of Beijing's votes in favour of the PRC in 1971 were
from Africa, including four who still had diplomatic relations with Taipei....
It is certain that without the African votes, China would not have succeeded.
Id. at 40.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that "[tihe acceleration of South49.
South trade and investment is one of the most significant features of recent
developments in the global economy.").
50.
Chris Melville & Olly Owen, China and Africa: A New Era of "South-South
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/
7,
2005,
Cooperation," July
south_2658.jsp.
51.
Id.
52.
Paragraph 45 of the Doha Declaration, adopted following the Second South
Summit in Doha, Qatar, states: "We are deeply concerned by the continued
marginalization of the LDCs in the global economy and the continued deterioration of
their economic and social conditions in spite of the commitments made by developed
partners at the Third UN conference on LDCs in May 2001." Second South Summit,
Doha, Qatar, June 12-16, 2005, Doha Declaration, 45, G.77/SS/2005/1, available at
http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/en/intro.html [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
The Group of 77 and China Second South Summit convened in Doha from June 121. The first South Summit was held in Havana, Cuba, from April 1016, 2005. Id.
14, 2000. Id. 2.
53.
According to paragraph 23 of the Doha Declaration, adopted following the
Second South Summit in Doha:
Globalization presents opportunities, challenges and risks for developing
countries. We note with deep concern that the processes of globalization and
liberalization have produced uneven benefits among and within countries and
that the world economy has been characterized by slow and lopsided growth
and instability. The income between developed and developing countries has
widened, and poverty has increased in many developing countries.

20081

CHINA-AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT A CRITIO.UE

517

underdevelopment are some of the issues that fuel renewed talks for
greater South-South cooperation. Several multilateral organizations
now provide the platform for the promotion of South-South
cooperation, including the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), 54 the United Nations Development
56
Program (UNDP),55 and the Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77).
1.

The First South Summit

The First South Summit was held in Havana, Cuba, between
April 10 and April 14 of 2000. 57 From July 29-30, 2003, the AsianAfrican Sub-regional Organizations Conference (AASROC) took place
in Bandung, Indonesia. At the Conference, a decision was made to
establish a New Strategic Partnership for Promoting South-South
Cooperation. 5 8
From December 16-19, 2003, the High-level
Conference on South-South Cooperation was held in Marrakech,
Morocco, at which the Marrakech Declaration on South-South
Cooperation (Marrakech Declaration) and the Marrakech Framework
of Implementation of South-South Cooperation
(Marrakech
Framework) were adopted. 59
In the Marrakech Declaration,
participants pledged to strengthen cooperation in a number of

Id.

23.
54.
See United
Nations
Conference
on Trade
and Development,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/StartPage.asp?intItemID=2068
(search
"SouthSouth") (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (providing a variety of information on South-South
trade).
55.
See United Nations Development Programme, http://www.undp.org/ (search
"South-South") (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (providing information on South-South
cooperation).
56.
Established on June 15, 1964, by seventy-seven developing countries that
were signatories of the "Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries," a document
issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, the Group of 77 (G-77) is the largest Third World
coalition in the United Nations. The Group of 77 at the United Nations, About the
Group of 77, http://www.g77.org/doc/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2008). The first Ministerial
Meeting of the Group of 77 took place in Algiers in 1967, at which the Charter of
Algiers was adopted. Id. The stated goal of the G-77 is to provide "the means for the
developing world to articulate

and promote its collective economic interests and

enhance its joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues in the
United Nations system, and promote economic and technical cooperation among
developing countries (ECDC/TCDC)." Id.
57.
See Third World Network, G77's South Summit, Havana, Cuba, 10-14
April 2000, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/havana.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
58.
26 Asian-African Countries to Attend AASORC in Indonesia's Bandung,
PEOPLE'S DAILY (P.R.C.), July 28, 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200307/28/
eng20030728_121096.shtml.
59.
High-Level Conference on South-South Cooperation, Marrakech, Morocco,
Dec. 15-19, 2003, Marrakech Framework of Implementation of South-South
Cooperation, available at http://www.g77.org/marrakechlMarrakech-Framework.htm
[hereinafter Marrakech Framework].
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different areas, including trade, technology, health, education, and
debt management. 60 Pursuant to the Marrakech Framework, G-77
members agreed (among other things) to study the potential of
intensifying interactions between business agents in developing
countries, 61 to enhance coordination and joint negotiating positions
on major issues of the multilateral trading negotiations, 62 and to
6 3
promote investment among developing countries.
2.

The Second South Summit

The Second South Summit took place in Doha, Qatar, from June
12-16, 2005, where the Group of 77 and China adopted the Doha
Declaration and the Doha Plan of Action. 64 In the Doha Declaration,
participants reaffirmed "the role of South-South cooperation in the
overall context of multilateralism, as a continuing process vital to
confront the challenges faced by the South and as a valuable
65
contribution to development and the need to further strengthen it."
They recognized "the increasing importance of South-South trade and
economic cooperation" 66 and called for "a more energetic effort to
deepen and revitalize South-South cooperation to take advantage of
67
the new geography of international economic relations."
Participants also reaffirmed that "South-South trade should be
enhanced and further market access from68 developing countries must
continue to stimulate South-South trade.
Today, South-South trade69 and South-South investment are on
the rise. 70 Foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing countries

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
1.
Id. 5.
Id. 8.
See supra note 52.
Marrakech Framework, supra note 59, at
Id.
12.
Id.
Id. 27.

6.

[D]eveloping countries are trading and investing more, and doing so
increasingly among themselves. In just ten years-between 1995 and
2005-the share of the South in global merchandise trade increased from
27.6% to 36%. Developing countries now account for nearly one fourth of
world imports of commercial services and are seeing a large and everexpanding share of the U.S., Japan and EU export markets.

Supachai Panitchpakdi, Sec'y-General, UNCTAD, New Dynamics of South-South
Development, Keynote Address on United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation
(Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=
7991&intItemID=3549&lang-l.
In 2004 alone, "South-South trade soared by 14.6%, and has now outpaced total
world trade growth." Id. "South-South trade is also becoming more complementary
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and transition economies now account for about 17% of the world's

FDI flows. 71 The geographical composition of FDI from developing
countries and transition economies reveals the growing importance of
Asia as a significant source of FDI. In 1980, Asia's share of the total
stock of FDI from developing countries and transition economies
stood at about 23%; the figures increased to 46% in 1990, and stood at
62% in 2005.72 Today, China is in the top ten in terms of FDI home
countries. 73 According to the 2006 World Investment Report, China
and Malaysia are among the top ten sources of FDI in Africa. 74 There
is a growing realization that there are many benefits for developing
countries associated with increasing South-South relations. 75 The
importance of South-South cooperation has been recognized by the
international community at various United Nations conferences, such
as the 2005 World Summit, 76 the International Conference on

and more diversified, moving from primary commodities to manufactures and high-end
services." Id.
70.
Id. (observing that "outward FDI from developing and transition economies
is expanding fast-reaching $133 billion in 2005, the highest level ever-but it is
increasingly going into other developing countries").
71.
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2006-FDI
from Developing and Transitioning Economies: Implications for Development, at 105,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (2006) [hereinafter World Investment Report].
72.
Id. at 112.
73.
Id. at 114 (noting that in 2005, FDI from China reached $11 billion,
representing the fourth largest outflow from developing and transition economies).
74.
Id. at 117.
75.
According to Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD:
For developing countries, increasing South-South relations have many benefits,
based largely on complementary environmental, climatic, cultural, economic
and social conditions. In the investment arena, for example, South-South FDI
brings technology, skills, know-how and business models that are often more
suitable for developing country needs than those from the developed world.
UNCTAD has conducted Investment Policy Reviews in over 20 developing
countries. The evidence emerging from these studies suggest that South-South
investment tends to be labour-intensive and create more jobs than the
generally capital-intensive FDI from the North. This is certainly the case for
Asian investment in Africa.
Panitchpakdi, supranote 69.
76.
In paragraph 40 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the convened "world
Heads of State and Government" stated: "We recognize the achievements and great
potential for South-South cooperation and encourage the promotion of such
cooperation, which compliments North-South cooperation as an effective contribution
to development and as a means to share best practices and provide enhanced technical
cooperation." 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html.
"The 2005 World Summit, held on 14-16 September 2005, was a follow-up summit
meeting to the United Nations' 2000 Millennium Summit...." Wikipedia, 2005 World
Summit, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_World Summit (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
The Millennium Summit had produced the Millennium Declaration of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), and at the 2005 World Summit, representatives of the 191
(now 192) member states "met in New York City for what the United Nations described
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Financing for Development (held in Monterrey in March 2002),77 and
the World Summit on Sustainable Development (held in
7
Johannesburg in August 2002). 8
C. Asia-African Summit 2005 (Bandung II)
President Hu Jintao was present at an April 24, 2005 event
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Bandung Conference
in Bandung, Indonesia. 79 Also present were President Obasanjo of
Nigeria, Prime Minister Singh of India, and President George
Maxwell Richards of Trinidad and Tobago.8 0 The chairmen of the
Asia-Africa Summit, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of
Indonesia and President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, both signed
the Declaration on the Asian-African New Strategic Partnership

as 'a once-in-a-generation opportunity to take bold decisions in the areas of
development, security, human rights and reform of the United Nations."' Id.
77.
The International Conference on Financing for Development was a summitlevel meeting convened by the United Nations in Monterrey in March of 2002 to
address key financial issues related to global development. An important feature of the
conference was the involvement of inter-governmental development organization such
as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the IMF, as well as
representatives of civil society and the business sector. See Financing for Development
Office, Overview of Financing for Development, http://www.un.org/esalffdlMonterrey/
Conference/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2008).
The conference ended on 22 March 2002 with the adoption by acclamation of the
Monterrey Consensus by the heads of state and government in Monterrey, Mexico.
U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for Sustainable Dev., Monterrey Consensus of
the International Conference on Financing for Development,
1, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/Monterrey-Consensus.htm
[hereinafter
Monterrey Consensus].
Paragraph 19 of the Monterrey Consensus reads: "We
encourage South-South cooperation, including through triangular cooperation, to
facilitate exchange of views on successful strategies, practices and experience and
replication of projects." Id. 19. Moreover, paragraph 32 reads:
We also commit ourselves to enhancing the role of regional and subregional
agreements and free trade areas, consistent with the multilateral trading
system, in the construction of a better world trading system. We urge
international financial institutions, including the regional development banks,
to continue to support projects that promote subregional and regional
integration among developing countries and countries with economies in
transition.
Id.

32.
78.
See World Summit on Sustainable Development, http://www.un.org
events/wssd (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
79.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the P.R.C., Hu Jintao Attends the
Commemoration Events of the 50th Anniversary of Bandung Conference, Apr. 24, 2005,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/hjtfw/t193910.htm.
80.
Id.
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(NAASP). 81 The commemorating event came on the heels of the 2005
Asia-Africa Summit (2005 Summit).
At the 2005 Summit, Asian and African leaders sought to
reinvigorate the spirit of Bandung I. In the NAASP, states affirmed
that Bandung I "remains as a beacon in guiding the future progress of
Asia and Africa ' 8 2 and reiterated their conviction "that the Spirit of
Bandung, the core principles of which are solidarity, friendship[,] and
cooperation, continues to be a solid, relevant[,] and effective
foundation for fostering better relations among Asian and African
countries and resolving global issues of common concern."83 The
NAASP serves as a framework for building a bridge between Asia and
Africa and covers three broad areas of cooperation: political solidarity,
economic cooperation, and socio-cultural relations.8 4 The NAASP
builds on the ten principles of Bandung.8 5 In the area of trade and
economic development, it emphasizes "the need to promote practical
cooperation between the two continents in areas such as trade,
information
and
finance,
tourism,
industry,
investment,
transportation,
technology,
energy, health,
communication
8' 6
agriculture, water resources[,] and fisheries.
D.

Conclusion

Unfolding China-Africa trade must be analyzed within the
broader context of the South-South partnership discourse.
Undoubtedly, the future will be marked by a reshaping of trade

India Ministry of External Affairs, Declaration on the New Asian-African
81.
Strategic Partnership, Apr. 24, 2005,, http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/
2005/04/24jd01.htm.
Id.
82.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
According to the Declaration on the New Strategic Partnership, the core
principles that underlie NAASP are:
(1) The Ten Principles of Bandung of the 1955 Asian-African Conference; (2)
Recognition of diversity between and within the regions, including different
social and economic systems and levels of development; (3) Commitment to
open dialogue, based on mutual respect and benefit; (4) Promotion of nonexclusive cooperation by involving all stakeholders; (5) Attainment of practical
and sustainable cooperation based on comparative advantage, equal
partnership, common ownership and vision, as well as a firm and shared
conviction to address common challenges; (6) Promotion of sustainable
partnership by complementing and building upon existing regional and subregional initiatives in Asia and Africa; (7) Promotion of a just, democratic,
transparent, accountable, and harmonious society; (8) Promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to
development; (9) Promotion of collective and unified efforts in multilateral fora.
86.

Id.
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relations in a manner not seen since colonial times. Governments
and businesses in the global South will increasingly bypass
traditional trading relationships developed within the context of
European colonial expansion in favor of new relations with other
southern states. As of yet, however, there is no evidence that SouthSouth cooperation is more progressive or less selfish than hegemonic
North-South relations. The notion of South-South cooperation must
be increasingly and continually probed to assess whether its present
manifestations advance the vision of the architects of the discourse.

III. LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF SINO-AFRICAN TRADE AND
INVESTMENT RELATIONS

FOCAC serves as the official platform for "collective consultation
and dialogue and [as] a cooperation mechanism" between China and
cooperating African states. 8 7 Five core documents (the Framework
Documents) spell out the legal and policy framework of unfolding
trade and investment relations between China and Africa: the 2000
Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2000
Beijing Declaration);8 8 the 2000 Programme for China-Africa
Cooperation in Economic and Social Development (2000 Programme
for Cooperation);8 9 the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Addis
Ababa Action Plan 2004-2006 (Addis Ababa Action Plan);9 0 the
Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (Declaration of the Beijing Summit);91 and the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan 2007-2009 (2007-2009

87.
The two stated purposes of FOCAC are "to strengthen consultation and
expand cooperation" and to "promote[] both political dialogue and economic cooperation
and trade, with a view to seeking mutual reinforcement and common development."
Forum
on
China-Africa
Cooperation,
Characteristics
of
FOCAC,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/gyltIltjj/t157576.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
88.
See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 1st Ministerial Conference,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/gylt/dyjbzhy/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (providing the
framework documents).
89.
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Programme for China-Africa
Cooperation in Economic and Social Development, Platform for Cooperation,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t157834.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008)
[hereinafter Programmefor China-Africa Cooperation].
90.
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa CooperationAddis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006), available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/
features/focac/185197.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
91.
Beijing Summit & Third Ministerial Conference of Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation, Beijing, P.R.C., Nov. 4-5, 2006, Declarationof the Beijing Summit of the
Forum
on
China-Africa
Cooperation
(Draft),
available
at
http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/16/content_6586.htm [hereinafter Declaration
of the Beijing Summit].

2008]

CHINA-AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT A CRITIQUE

523

Action Plan).92 There is not yet any regional free trade agreement
between China and countries in Africa, although there are bilateral
trade and investment treaties between China and some countries in
93
the continent.
A. The Core Framework Documents
The First Ministerial Conference produced the 2000 Beijing
Declaration and the 2000 Programme for Cooperation. Noting "a
huge gap between the rich North and the poor South," the 2000
Beijing Declaration reaffirmed "that the injustice and inequality in
the current international system are incompatible with the trend of
the times towards world peace and development, hinder the
development of the countries of the South[,] and pose threats to
international peace and security. '9 4 The two sides pledged "to further
consolidate and expand China-Africa cooperation at all levels and in
all fields and to establish within the framework of South-South
cooperation a new-type, long-term[,] and stable partnership based on
'95
equality and mutual benefit.
The 2000 Programme for Cooperation covers a host of issues,
including trade and investment, debt relief and cancellation,
96
exploration and use of natural resources and energy, and tourism.

92.
See Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
zflt/eng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Beijing Action
Plan].
93.
Id. There is a possibility of a free trade agreement between China and the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU, comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
South Africa and Swaziland) in the near future. See infra note 556 and accompanying
text. See also Hans Grinsted Jensen & Ron Sandrey, A possible SACU/China Free
Trade Agreement (FTA): Implications for the SA manufacturing sector, TRALAC
Working Papers, No. 8/2006, July 2006.
94.
The two sides also stressed that "the establishment of a just and equitable
new international political and economic order is indispensable for the democratization
of international relations and for the effective participation of developing countries in
the international process of decision-making." Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,
Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, available at
http://spanish.10thnpc.org.cn/english/features/ focac/185148.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2008) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
95.
According to paragraph 10 of the 2000 Beijing Declaration:
We decide to vigorously promote further China-Africa cooperation in the
economic, trade, financial, agricultural, medical care and public health,
scientific and technological, cultural, educational, human resources
development, transportation, environmental, tourism and other areas on the
basis of the principles enshrined in this Declaration and the Program for
China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development adopted at the
forum so as to promote the common development of China and Africa.
Id. 1 10.
96.

See supra note 89.
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Regarding trade and investment, the two sides called attention to the
need to move towards balanced and enhanced trade, acknowledged
"the need to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and
in diversifying the composition of African exports," and pledged "to
collaborate and share experience in overcoming Africa's export
dependence on primary commodities, single products[,] and raw
materials. '97 The two sides also stressed "the need to harmonize
their trade policies and to participate actively in trade negotiations,
including within the framework of the WTO, in order to ensure that
the multilateral trading system contributes to enhanced
competitiveness, economic growth[,] and sustainable development of
their countries. ' 98 Most important for Africa, the two sides stressed
the "importance of providing better and preferential access to the
Chinese market for African exports of commercial importance." 99
With respect to investment, the two sides pledged "to encourage
mutual investment by their enterprises, the exchange of experience in
business management, the setting up of joint ventures or sole
ownership enterprises, including small or medium ones[,] and the
establishment of joint business fora." 100 For its part, China agreed to
"set aside special funds to support and encourage investment by wellestablished Chinese enterprises" in countries in Africa and "to set up
joint equity or cooperation projects adapted to local need in terms of
job creation and transfer of technologies."'' 1 China also agreed "to
share with African countries its experience in the field of investment
promotion relating to the establishment and management of free and
'10 2
special economic zones.
The Declaration of the Beijing Summit and the 2007-2009 Action
Plan were adopted at the conclusion of the Beijing Summit & Third
Ministerial
Conference
on China-Africa
Cooperation (Beijing
Summit), which took place November 3-5, 2006.103 In the Declaration

97.
Programmefor China-Africa Cooperation,supra note 89, 4.1.
98.
Id. 4.2.
99.
Id. 4.5.
100.
Id. 5.1.
101.
Id. 5.2.
102.
Id. 5.3.
103.
The Beijing Summit & Third Ministerial Conference on China-Africa
Cooperation brought together the Heads of State and Government of the People's
Republic of China and forty-eight African countries. See China-Africa Forum, ChinaAfrica
Cooperation Fruitful over
Past
50
Years,
Nov.
1,
2006,
http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/01/content_4312.htm (describing the conference
as "the highest-level and the largest meeting between Chinese and African leaders
since China and African countries started to forge cooperative ties in the 1950s"). In
his address delivered on November 4, 2006, President Hu Jintao identified several
fields of cooperation and the fundamental principles that would guide the relationship.
The goal, according to Hu, is to "deepen political relation of equality and mutual trust,"
"broaden win-win economic cooperation," "expand exchange for cultural enrichment,"
"promote balanced and harmonious global development," and "strengthen cooperation
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of the Beijing Summit, leaders reaffirmed the "establishment of a new
type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring
political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation[,]
and cultural exchanges."'10 4 With respect to trade and investment,
they purposed to "[d]eepen and broaden mutually beneficial
cooperation, encourage and promote two-way trade and investment,
explore new modes of cooperation[,] and give top priority to
cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure, industry, fishery, IT, public
health and personnel training to draw on each other's strengths for
the benefit of our peoples."'10 5 To this end, the leaders proposed to
"[i]ncrease high-level visits, conduct strategic dialogue, enhance
mutual political trust[,] and promote enduring friendship."'10 6 With
respect to trade, the two sides agreed to "[c]ontinue to work to create
a favorable condition to grow China-Africa trade in more balanced
manner," and to "[s]trengthen cooperation in customs, taxation,
inspection[,] and quarantine to facilitate healthy and orderly growth
of China-Africa trade.' 10 7 Regarding investment, the two sides also
agreed to "facilitate the negotiation, conclusion[,] and implementation
of
of the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection 08
Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation"'
and "to strengthen cooperation among their small- and medium-sized
enterprises to promote Africa's industrial development and enhance
Africa's production and export capacity."' 10 9
B. Patternsof China-Africa Trade and Investment Flows
Trade between China and Africa has grown exponentially since
2000. China-Africa trade volume increased from $10 billion to $18
billion between 2000 and 2003.110 In 2004, "China's exports to Africa
rose by 36% year-on-year (to $13.82 billion), while imports ... surged
81% to $15.65 billion."11 ' In 2005, total trade between Africa and
China surged to $40 billion. 1 12 In 2006, China-Africa trade was
valued at $55.5 billion, 40% more than in it was valued in 2005.113 Of

and mutual support in international affairs." President Hu Jintao's Address, supra
note 3.
104.
Declaration of the Beijing Summit, supra note 91.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Beijing Action Plan, supra note 92, 3.3.
108.
Id. 3.2.2.
109.
Id. 3.2.4.
Chris Alden, Leveraging the Dragon: Toward "AnAfrica That Can Say No,"
110.
EAFRICA, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5336
[hereinafter Leveraging the Dragon].
111.
Factbox: China-Africa Trade Links, REUTERS, Jan 30, 2007, available at
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L3052521.htm.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
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this amount, China's exports to Africa were worth $26.7 billion, up
43% from 2005, and imports from Africa were worth $28.8 billion
dollars, up 37% from 2005.114 One-third of China's crude oil imports
115
come from Africa.
Africa's exports to China have grown. However, exports from
Africa are mainly comprised of petroleum and raw materials.1 1 6 Oil
and natural gas currently account for more than 62% of total African
exports to China, followed closely by ores and metals (17%) and
agricultural raw materials (7%).117 There is a noticeable geographic
concentration in the source of Africa's exports to China. Three
countries-Angola, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congosupply 85% of African oil exports to China.11 8 However, China is also
aggressively concluding deals with different countries in Africa. In
early 2004, Total Gabon S.A. reportedly signed a contract with
China's Sinopec under which Gabonese crude oil would be sold to
China for the first time.'1 9 Also in 2004, following Chinese VicePresident Zeng Qinghong's visit to South Africa, the two countries
signed agreements that included a deal paving the way for the export
120
of South African citrus to China.
Since 2002, greenfield FDI projects by Chinese investors have
grown.121 By 2000, there were at least 499 Chinese companies in
Africa, with a total contractual investment of $990 million. 122 At
least 750,000 Chinese live and work in Africa today. 123 At the end of
2005, China's investment in Africa totaled $6.27 billion. 124 It is
estimated that Chinese direct investment in Africa reached $370
million in 2006 and that Chinese-funded projects are now scattered

114.

China-Africa Trade Hits US$55.5 Billion in 2006, PEOPLE'S DAILY (P.R.C.),

Jan. 30, 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/200701/30/eng2007013O_346085.html
115.
China Defends Oil Trade with Africa, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 12, 2007,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/12business/oil.php.
116.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 80 (observing that oil and natural gas are the
single dominant category of products exported from Africa to China.)
117.
Id. at 80-82 (observing that "China's oil imports from Africa have been
increasing at an annual compounded rate of 30 percent, slightly higher than the
growth rate for imports from the rest of the world, which is 26 percent.").
118.
Id. at 81.
119.

Fact Box: An Overview of China-Africa Trade Links, DAILY TIMES (Pak.),

Jan. 30, 2007, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%
5C01%5C30%5Cstory_30-1-2007_pg5 29.
Total, a multinational energy company
operating in more than 130 countries, is reportedly, the fourth largest publicly-traded
oil and gas company. Total, Presentation, May 10, 2007, http://www.total.com/en/
group/presentation (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
120.
South Africa Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Deputy President Jacob Zuma to CoChair Second South Africa- - People's Republic of China Binational Commission,
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004/chinO621.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
121.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 97-99.
122.

TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 70.

123.
Chinese Flocking in Numbers to a New Frontier: Africa, INVL HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/17/news/malawi.php.
124.
China-Africa Trade Hits US$55.5 Billion in 2006, supra note 114.
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across forty-nine African countries. 125
China now has several
126
Investment Development and Trade Promotion Centers in Africa,
and the country has undertaken to "establish a China-Africa Joint
Business Council in coordination with the Chambers of Commerce of
African countries"'127 and to "establish a China-Africa Products
Exhibition Center in China to promote two-way trade and facilitate
128
access for African products to the Chinese market."'
Three Chinese entities play critical roles in the unfolding
relations: the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). All three corporations
are located within the State Economic and Trade Commission and
have the mandate to establish overseas oil exploration and buy
operating rights abroad. 129 In exchange for a contract to supply
10,000 barrels of crude oil per day, China extended a $2 billion loan
to Angola in 2004.130 During Vice Premier Zeng Peiyang's visit to
Angola in March 2005, China agreed to provide the Angolan
government with development aid in the form of a $6.3 million
interest-free loan, as well as an additional $2.2 billion in soft loans in
early 2006.131 It has been reported that China and Angola have
signed agreements pertaining to the telecommunications sector under
which China pledged "to invest $400 million in Angola's Telecom and
a
further
$100
million
to
upgrade
Angola's
military
communications. ' 132 Chinese companies are also winning lucrative

125.
Id.
126.
In the Declaration of the Beijing Summit, China pledged to "strive to make
its investment and trade centers in Africa a success, and to facilitate the establishment
of similar centers of African countries in China." Programme for China-Africa
Cooperation, supranote 89, 4.4.2.
127. Id.
4.4.3. In 2005, a three-year United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) project named "Support to Establishing the China-Africa Business Council
(CABC)" was launched with an initial funding of $1 million. The project is a joint
initiative between UNDP, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and China Society of
Promotion for the Guangcai Programme (Guangcai). CABC will be established between
China and a first group of six African countries: Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique,
Nigeria, Tanzania, and Kenya. The CABC Secretariat was officially established in
Beijing in August 2005.
It is believed that CABC is the first Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) initiative between China and Africa under the South-South
Cooperation Framework. See United Nations Development Programme, Support to
Establishing the China Africa Business Council (CABC), www.undp.org.cnl
projects/43576.pdf (last visited Jun. 10, 2008).
128.
Id. 4.4.4.
129. See CINDY HURST, CHINA'S OIL RUSH IN AFRICA 5 (2006) (noting that
China's three largest oil companies, CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC, boosted spending by
at least nine percent in 2004 on oil exploration and production worldwide.).
130. Don Lee, China Barrels Ahead in Oil Market, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004,
available at www.energybulletin.net/3159.html.
131.
Loro Horta & Ian Storey, China's Portuguese Connection, YALEGLOBAL,
June 22, 2006, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7634.
132. Id.
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contracts such as the construction of railroads, housing projects, and
oil refineries. 133 On May 10, 2006, Sonangol, Angola's state-owned oil
company, and Sinopec reportedly launched a $2.2 billion joint bid for
oil blocks 17 and 18.134 It is believed that the new blocks have
estimated reserves of 3 billion barrels and 1.5 billion barrels,
respectively. 1 35 Sinopec secured a 40% stake in offshore oil block 18
after proposing a $1.1 billion government signature bonus out of a
136
total investment amounting to more than $1.4 billion.
In July 2005, China and Nigeria signed an $800 million crude-oil
sale deal involving Petrochina International and the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).137 Under the arrangement,
NNPC will supply 30,000 barrels of crude oil per day to China for one
year. 138 In January 2006, CNOOC agreed to pay $2.3 billion for a
stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field. 139 Also in 2006, China secured a
$4 billion deal for drilling licenses in Nigeria. 140 Moreover, China has
concluded an offshore exploration deal with Kenya that allows
CNOOC to explore six blocks covering 115,343 square kilometers
(44,500 square miles) in the north and south of Kenya. 14 1 Chinese

133.
Id.
134.
Lora Horta, China and Angola Strengthen Bilateral Relationship, PINR,
June 23,
2006, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view-report&report_id=516&
language-id=l.
135.
Id.
136.
Neil Breslin, Angola Set to "Turn East" with China PM Visit, REUTERS,
June 19, 2006, available at http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?
nav03=47148&navO2=43782&nav0l=43092 (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
137.
China-NigeriaSign Oil Supply Pact, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.), July
9, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200507/O9/content_3195552.htm.
138.
Id.
139.
In January 2006, CNOOC announced that the company had agreed to pay
nearly $2.3 billion in cash to acquire a large stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field.
David Barboza, Chinese Oil Firm to Invest Billions in Nigerian Field, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Jan 9, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/09business/cnooc.php.
The
deal is one of the biggest overseas acquisitions ever by a Chinese company. As part of
the deal, CNOOC would get a big stake in the oil field located in the Niger Delta. Id.
It is reported that CNOOC has committed to spend $2.25 billion over the next few
years to help develop the Nigerian project. Id.
140.
China and Nigeria Agree Oil Deal, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk12/hilbusiness/4946708.stm (reporting that in return for investing
$4 billion (22.25bn) in oil and infrastructure projects in Nigeria, China secured four oil
drilling licenses from Nigeria. China will buy a controlling stake in Nigeria's 110,000
barrel-a-day Kaduna oil refinery and build a railroad system and power stations).
141.
During President Hu's 2006 visit to Kenya, the two countries signed a deal
that would allow CNOOC to prospect for oil off of Kenya's coast. Cathy Majtenyi,
China Signs Deal for Kenya Oil Exploration, VOICE OF AM., Apr. 28, 2006,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-04/2006-04-28-voal9.cfm?CFID=
126228082&CFTOKEN=74026830. The deal allows VNOOC to source for oil in six
areas covering more than 100,000 square kilometers in the Indian Ocean area. Id.
Surprisingly, the oil agreement was not mentioned in a joint statement listing
agreements signed during Hu's visit to the country. Id. As he read from the joint
statement, Kenyan Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju reemphasized Kenya's position
regarding Taiwan. According to the Minister, "The Kenyan government expressed its
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foreign direct investment in Mozambique in 2005 stood at $9 million,
up from $436,000 in 2004.142 In 2004, the volume of trade between
143
China and Mozambique stood at $120 million, up by 66%.

IV. CHINA'S AFRICA POLICY, AFRICA'S CHINA POLICY: A CRITIQUE

Why is China interested in Africa? Does China have a clearly
identifiable policy for Africa? 144 And why is Africa returning China's
advances? Does Africa have a clear policy to guide the unfolding
relations with China? These questions are addressed in Part IV.
Regarding China's Africa policy, prior to 2006, China made general
reference to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 14 5 Traces of
China's Africa policy could also be found in statements by Chinese
leaders, particularly statements at diplomatic conferences and in the
course of their tours of Africa. 146 Issued for the first time in January
2006, the Africa policy paper attempts to formally and concretely
address China's interests and goals in Africa, as well as the means for
achieving these goals. 147 While African governments have warmly
embraced China, Africa has yet to develop a coherent and clearly
articulated strategy to guide its engagement with China. It appears
that African leaders are approaching China from "a residual
liberation paradigm" rather than "a contemporary economic
paradigm" that would require them to actively and strategically

opposition to Taiwan independence in any form and expressed its support for China's
efforts to realize national reunification." Id.
142.
Horta & Storey, supra note 131.
143.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 103.
144.
These questions which first surfaced following China's engagement with
Africa in the 1960s persist today. In his 1974 book, Alaba Ogunsanwo asks:
Why is China interested in Africa? Has there been a coherent policy towards
Africa in the period under consideration or is it simply a policy of fomenting
revolutions everywhere and especially in places where revolution is detrimental
to the interests of imperialism? Is there a genuine desire for the independence
and welfare of the African people or is there a grand strategy aimed at bringing
the whole continent under the aegis of China.
OGUNSANWO, supra note 43, at 1.
145.
See supra text accompanying note 31 (describing the history of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence).
146.
Tours of Africa by Chinese leaders are not new. Beginning in 1963,
successive leaders have made historic tours of parts of the continent, including Zhou
Enlai's ten-nation tour in 1964, Vice Premier Li Xiannian's tour in 1979, Premier Zhao
Ziyang's eleven-nation tour in 1982, and President Hu Jintao's eight-nation tour in
2006.
147.
One of the stated goals of issuing the African Policy Paper, according to the
Chinese Government, is "to present to the world the objectives of China's policy
towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in
various fields in the coming years." China's African Policy, supranote 8.
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preserve Africa's interest. 148 Thus, areas where Africa's interests
diverge from Beijing's interests are yet to be clearly identified and
addressed.149
A. China'sAfrica Policy
In the Africa Policy Paper, China promises to proceed to
establish a strategic partnership with Africa that emphasizes political
equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and
cultural exchange. 150 The general principles and objectives of China's
Africa policy, according to the Policy Paper, are "[s]incerity,
friendship[,] and equality"; 151 "[m]utual benefit, reciprocity[,] and
15 3
15 2
"[m]utual support and close coordination";
common prosperity";
common
and seeking
other
each
from
and
"[1]earning
' 15 4
areas
four
key
outlines
Paper
Part IV of the Policy
development.
science,
"education,
(3)
of cooperation: (1) politics; (2) economics;
culture, health and social aspects"; and (4) "peace and security." In
economics, China outlines plans for cooperation in a host of areas,
including trade, investment, financial cooperation, agriculture,
infrastructure, tourism, and resource cooperation. 155 Regarding trade
and investment, China's agenda is five-fold: increased market access
for African commodities, 15 6 extension of duty-free privileges, 157 pacific

Leveraging the Dragon, supra note 110.
148.
149.
Id. (noting that African leaders "need . . . to recognise that there are
important areas where their national interests diverge from Beijing's," and citing, as
an example, China's status as a global leader in attracting foreign direct investment,
which clearly and directly competes with Africa's own needs for FDI).
150.
China's African Policy, supranote 8, part 3.
151.
Id. ("China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects
African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African
countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.").
Id. ("China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development
152.
and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social
development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.").
153.
Id. ("China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other
multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable
propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more
attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.").
154.
Id. ("China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's
experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in
education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance
capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of
sustainable development.").
155.
Id. part 4.
156.
Id. ('The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to
facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market.").
Id. ('The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to . ..
157.
fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed
African countries.").
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settlement of trade disputes, 158 private sector involvement, 159 and a
future possibility of negotiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with
African countries.
The Africa Policy Paper is vague on some important issues. For
example, regarding the possibility of FTAs between China and
countries in Africa, the Policy Paper merely states that "[w]hen
conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade
Agreement [sic] (FTA) with African countries and African regional
organizations.' 160 It is unclear what indicators will announce when
the conditions are ripe or who will be making that determination.
Regarding the promise of duty-free treatment, the Policy Paper states
that the Chinese government "will adopt more effective measures
to... fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods
from the least developed African countries.' 1 61 However, many
questions remain unanswered. What goods will qualify for duty-free
treatment? What is the time-frame for fulfilling this promise? How
might tariff peaks and escalations erode the value of this promise? In
the same vein, China's promise to "adopt more effective measures to
facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese markets" is vague
with respect to the concrete steps that China will adopt to meet its
specified goal, and it does not indicate what constitutes an effective
market access measure.
Regarding investment, the Chinese government plans to
encourage and support the investment and business of Chinese
enterprises in Africa, and "to provide preferential loans and buyer
credits to this end."'162 The Chinese Government is also ready "to
explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment
cooperation with African countries '163 and "to formulate and improve
relevant policies, provide guidance and service[,] and offer
convenience." 164 While the Chinese government expressed a keen
interest in protecting investments-observing that "[t]he two sides
should work together to create a favorable environment for
investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and
interests of investors from both sides"-it is completely silent on the
potential human rights obligations of Chinese businesses operating in

158.
Id. ("[China] intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through
bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation.").
159.
Id. ("Efforts will be made to encourage business communities on both sides
to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry.").
160.
Id. (emphasis added).
161.
Id. (emphasis added).
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.

532

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 41:305

Africa. 165 The Policy Paper is mute regarding how the Chinese
government will address existing barriers to investment in China,
and it fails to address the ethical responsibility of Chinese investors
operating in Africa.
What, then, is the legal status of the African Policy Paper? Will
China keep its numerous promises to Africa? Only time will tell.
China's African Policy is not a treaty and thus is not recognized as
binding under international law. 166 Countries in Africa will have no
legal recourse should China renege on its promises. If the Policy
Paper was issued simply to silence critics, as some observers suggest,
it may be no more than a public relations campaign and a weapon in
the broader (though unacknowledged) struggle between the United
States and China over Africa's resources. 167 Moreover, China's
numerous promises may be inimical to the interests of ordinary
Africans in that its promises prompt the leaders of Africa's
undemocratic states to offer reciprocal promises that have not been
vetted by the general public in those countries. The need for free
trade agreements between China and regions in Africa thus become
readily apparent. The process of negotiating an FTA, if transparent,
could at least give Africans the opportunity to voice opposition to any
aspects of the agreement they perceive to be negative. Whether trade
agreements (once negotiated) will be in the interest of African peoples
is debatable, despite the promise made in the Africa Policy Paper that
fundamental interests of both the
China will proceed "from the
168
Chinese and African peoples.
B. China's "Real"Interest in Africa
China's Cold War relations with Africa "w[ere] driven mainly by
anti-capitalist ideologies of Marx and Mao, as well as by the Party

Id. ("The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and
165.
implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and
the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries.").
166.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as "an
international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Barry V. Sautman, Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with
167.
Africa 1 (Center on China's Transnational Relations, Working Paper No. 12, 20052006) (suggesting that China's African policy was announced in response to a 2005
publication by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The publication, More than
Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach to Africa, is critical of China's
engagements in Africa.); see also Vijay Prashad, A New Cold War Over Oil, FRONTLINE,
2 00
7/
Aug. 11, 2007 available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/
0812newcw.htm (suggesting that a new Cold War over oil has begun in Africa and that
the new players are the United States and China).
168.
China'sAfrican Policy, supra note 8, part 3.
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leadership's effort to counter Soviet influences in states like Angola
and the Congo."'1 69 In contrast, China's post-Cold War African policy
is shaped primarily by economic and diplomatic concerns. 170 Growing
17 1
mutual needs clearly drive the present China-Africa relationship.
China has much to gain from its relationship with Africa, both
politically and economically. 1 72 However, as Chris Alden rightly
warns, "it would be a mistake to ascribe a single motive to China's
1 73
growing interest in Africa."'
1.

Political Motivations

On the political front, China's concerns regarding Taiwan's
political ambitions, its endeavors for international significance, and
its need for strategic partners drive the country's foray into Africa.
Regarding Taiwan, China has not hidden the fact that one of the
reasons for pursuing relations with African states is to influence the
relationship of those states with Taiwan. 174 Stronger relations with
Africa would go a long way in thwarting Taiwan's effort to gain

169.
China's Influence in Africa-Implicationsfor U.S. Policy: Testimony Before
the Subcomm. on Africa, Human Rights, and InternationalOperationsof the H. Comm.
on InternationalRelations, 109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement by Ernest J. Wilson III)
[hereinafter Wilson Testimony]; see also Richard J. Payne & Cassandra R. Veney,
China's Post-Cold War African Policy, 38(9) AsIAN SURV. 867, 867 (1998) (observing
that during the Cold War, Beijing's influence in Africa was constrained not only by
Moscow and Washington but also by China's internal weaknesses, and that China's
foreign policy "was shaped significantly by its relationship with the superpowers").
170.
Wilson Testimony, supra note 169, at 7 (noting that in the post-Cold War
era, market motives are up and Marxism is down); Chris Alden, China in Africa,
SURVIVAL, Oct. 2005, at 147, 147-48 (2005) (observing that in contrast to the period
between 1963 and 1976, when ideological considerations shaped China's Africa policy,
"[tihere was now a shift towards 'diversity of form and mutual benefit' accompanying
the economic reforms of the post-Mao era.").
171.
Alden, supra note 170, at 153 (observing that today, China and Africa have
complementary economic and commercial needs).
172.
President Hu Jintao's Address, supra note 3 (observing that China and
Africa "share increasing common interests and have a growing mutual need," and that
building strong ties between China and Africa will promote development of each side);
see Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 101 (observing that "Africa's importance to China is
multi-layered"); see also Payne & Veney, supra note 169, at 867 (observing that Africa
plays a crucial role in China's achievement of its foreign policy goals and that relations
between China and Africa are likely to be expanded as an important component of
China's emergence as a global power).
173.
Alden, supra note 170, at 147; Katzenellenbogen, supra note 1 ("Africa has
an elevated importance to China because of Beijing's raised global role, its need for
energy and resources, but also because the continent's low per-capita income is an ideal
market for cheap Chinese goods.").
174.
Phillip Liu, Cross-StraitScramble for Africa: A Hidden Agenda in ChinaAfrica Cooperation Forum, 5 HARv. ASIA Q. (2001), available at
http://www.asiaquarterly.com/content/view/103/43/.
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diplomatic recognition and independence. 1 75 According to the Policy
Paper:
The one China principle is the political foundation for the
establishment and development of China's relations with African
countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government
appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African
countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official
relations and contacts with Taiwan[,] and support China's great cause
of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-todiplomatic
state relations with countries that have not yet established
176
ties with China on the basis of the one China principle.

Although not expressly stated in the African Policy Paper, the
consequence of African countries' cooperation with China is that
177
In
those African countries must cut their ties to Taiwan.
November 2006, China pledged "to . . .increase from 190 to over 440
the number of export items to China eligible for zero-tariff treatment
from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic
relations with China.''78
China is also in need of diplomatic allies and strategic
partnerships.17 9 Relations with Africa guarantees China more than
fifty allies in key multilateral institutions such as the World Trade
Organization.180 As Alden correctly notes, "[a]s a significant player in
multilateral organizations ... China recognizes that it needs to court
states have the
votes to protect and promote its interests. African
18 1
settings."'
multilateral
in
votes
of
bloc
largest single

175.

As Payne & Veney note:

The second overriding objective of China's foreign and domestic policies is the
restoration of its dynastic borders. With the return of Hong Kong to Chinese
control on July 1, 1997, Taiwan remains the most important part of China that
is not politically integrated into the mainland. Preventing Taiwan's
independence is one of the most significant goals of China's foreign policy.
Payne & Veney, supra note 169, at 868.
China's African Policy, supra note 8, part 3.
176.
See President Hu Jintao's Address, supra note 3 (promising to "cancel debt
177.
in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of 2005
owed by the heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed countries in Africa
that have diplomatic relations with China").
Beijing Action Plan, supra note 92, 3.3 (emphasis added).
178.
At the United Nations and other multilateral institutions such as the
179.
World Trade Organization (WTO), China's quest for respect, recognition, and
dominance requires that China cultivate strong alliances with other developing
countries. Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 101 (noting that China has "very important
political objectives" that are linked to the country becoming a great power and playing
more prominent roles on the global stage).
Id. (observing that on the political front, Africa is significant for the
180.
number of countries it comprises).
Alden, supra note 170, at 153 (stating that to date, "African votes have
181.
been crucial to Beijing's multilateral diplomacy, whether it be blocking resolutions as
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China's foray into Africa is also fueled by its concerns about
dominance by the superpowers and by its desire to bolster its own
position in the international system. In the past, China has criticized
the hegemonism of Washington and Moscow, and it continues to
express opposition to expansionism by any power.18 2 For example,
General Secretary Hu Yaobang has previously asserted:
The main forces jeopardising peaceful coexistence among nations today
are imperialism, hegemonism[,] and colonialism. True, the old system
of colonialism has disintegrated with the successive winning of
independence by nearly one hundred former colonial and semi-colonial
countries. Yet its remnants are far from being eliminated. The
Superpowers that practice hegemonism pose a new threat to the
183
peoples of the world.

2.

Economic Motivations

Economic considerations also motivate China's increasing
involvement in Africa. Pragmatism has replaced ideology. Africa
offers China access to natural resources (principally oil, gas, and solid
minerals), access to raw materials, a market for China's products,
and an opportunity to employ China's surplus labor in
manufacturing.
China's energy need is no secret.
Double-digit economic
growth,18 4 an automotive revolution, growing industrial production,
and a rising standard of living for China's middle class all combine to
fuel China's demand for oil and strategic minerals.18 5 China became
a net importer of oil for the first time in a quarter-century in
November 1993.186 In 2005, China overtook Japan to become the

the UN Commission on Human Rights . . . or garnering sufficient support to win a
second bid to host the Olympics in 2008.").
182.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 1 (observing that "[b]ecause of its self-perceived
position in the international system, China has constructed a fairly consistent foreign
policy aimed at preventing or limiting the development of 'hegemony,' whilstwhist at
the same time trying to carve out space for itself as its economy continues to grow.").
grow").
183.
Id. at 56 (quoting DIPLOMACY OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 560 (Han Nianlong
et al eds., (1990)).
184.
Payne & Veney, supra note 169, at 869 (noting that between 1978 and
1994, China's foreign trade grew more than 16% per year).
185.
Alden, supra note 170, at 148 (noting that "China's dynamic economic
growth fuels an ever-increasing need for energy and strategic minerals."); Payne &
Veney, supra note 169, at 869 (noting that rapid economic growth is fueling China's
need for oil and other natural resources). According to Alden, "the two decades of
sustained near-double-digit growth in the Chinese economy have increased its appetite
for a range of commodities, from iron ore to titanium, and in so doing have provided
producers based in Africa with a growing market as well as a much needed boost in
prices." Alden, supra note 170, at 148.
186.
Payne & Veney, supra note 169, at 869-70.
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second-largest importer of African oil after the United States. 18 7
Africa offers China access to relatively unexploited oil and strategic
natural resources. The continent currently supplies China with
about 30% of its oil imports.' 8 8 Beijing's oil purchases from African
nations constitute "a significant share of African oil producers'
export," thus making China an increasingly important actor on the
continent. 189 According to sources from the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce, China's dependency on import oil rose to 47% of its
annual demand in 2006, an increase of 4.1 percentage points from the
previous year. 190 In 2006, China produced 183.68 million tons of
crude oil (up 1.7%), while the country's net oil imports exceeded
162.87 million tons, an increase of 19.6%. 191 Experts predict that
China's demand for oil is bound to increase. 192 It is estimated that in
2007, China's crude oil output will grow less than 2%, while the
country's demand for both crude and other oil products will increase
by more than 6%. 193 Relations with Africa will give China vital
access to cheap sources of raw materials. 194 Overall, while China is of
value to Africa, Africa is of immense value to China, both "for its
resources and for the market it represents for cheap exports and
Chinese infrastructure investments." 195 In the unfolding interestbased relationship, Africa need not bargain from a position of
weakness. Africa is in a position to reject terms of engagement that
do not advance the continent's interest.
C. Africa's China Policy
African leaders have enthusiastically welcomed China. 196
Lesotho Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili called the 2006 Beijing

187.
Eisenmann, supra note 14; see Alden, supra note 170, at 148 (noting in
2005 that "China was consuming 5.46 million barrels per day (bbl/d), outstripping
Japan's 5.43m bbl/d, but still some distance from the United States's 19.7m bbl/d.").
188.
Eisenmann, supra note 14.
189.
Id. ("Beijing imports a quarter of Angola's oil, 60% of Sudan's and an
increasing percent[age] from Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Gabon.").
190.
China's Oil Dependency to Continue to Rise This Year, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (P.R.C.), Feb. 13, 2007, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/
commonnews/200702/20070204382842.html.
191.
Id.
192.
China's Oil Imports Surge as Country Begins Filling Strategic Reserves,
SINA, Oct. 12, 2006, http://english.sina.com/business/l/2006/1012/91636.html.
193.
China's Oil Dependency to Continue to Rise This Year, supra note 190.
194.
Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 101 (identifying access to raw materials as
one of the key motives for China's involvement in Africa).
195.
Alex Vines, The Scramble for Resources: African Case Studies, 13 S. AFR. J.
INT'L AFF. 63, 63 (2006).
196.
Id. at 64 (observing that African governments "have not hesitated to supply
Chinese Entrepreneurs with licenses to enable investment in their countries").
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Summit a "landmark full of hopes. '197 The response from regional
organizations within the continent has also been warm. 198
Nevertheless, Africa has yet to develop a coherent and clearly
articulated strategy to guide its future engagement with China. 199 At
the High-Level Dialogue and the Second Conference of Chinese and
Minister Pakalitha Mosisili,
African Entrepreneurs, Prime
representing the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
openly welcomed China to Africa: "We can take this opportunity to
tell China that the SADC and Africa are opportune destinations for
20 0
Chinese investment.
1.

African Leaders and China

Why have African leaders extended a warm reception to Beijing?
There are several factors that come into play: the shared history of
colonial domination, 20 1 China's identification of itself as a developing
country, and Beijing's emphasis on cooperation and respect rather
than subordination in its pursuit of relations with Africa. 20 2 As

197.
Lesotho PM: China-Africa Summit 'A Landmark Full of Hopes," XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.), Nov. 4, 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org/2006-11/04/
content_5065.htm.
198.
See, e.g., Wild & Mephan, supra note 2, at 1-4 (observing the acceptance of
the Southern African Development Community).
199. Id. (observing that the world has "seen China's strategy for Africa but that
Africa now needs to assert its own strategy for China").
200. Id.
201.
Regarding the warm reception of the Chinese by Africans in the 1960s,
Hutchinson writes:
In political terms, the Chinese were regarded with favour by Africans, for
China had never been associated with any scramble for Africa; the Chinese
were non-white and non-imperialist. Equally the Chinese had never been
humiliated by any African nation, and indeed the common suffering of Africa
and China at the hands of white imperialists was often stressed by both sides.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 178.
202.
Even in the area of foreign aid, China still stresses the principles of mutual
benefit and respect. During his tour of ten African countries from December 1963 to
February 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai announced the eight principles Governing Red
Chinese Foreign Aid. Most of the eight principles ring true today. Cooley, supra note
23, app. B, at 224-25 ('The Eight Principles Governing Red China Foreign Aid").
According to Principle One, "In the assistance it furnishes to other countries, the
Chinese government consistently observes the principles of equality and mutual
benefit. It never considers this assistance as a type of unilateral charity but rather as
mutual aid." Id. Principle Two states: "In furnishing aid to other countries, the
Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient states. It never
asks for any privilege and never poses conditions." Id. According to Principle Four, "In
furnishing economic aid . . . the Chinese government does not seek to place the
recipients in a state of dependency on China but rather to aid them to move forward,
step by step, on the pathway of self-sufficiency." Id.
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China is not a former colonial power, 203 many leaders see Beijing's
model of development as one that could be replicated successfully in
Africa, and recognize the possibility that economic ties with China
could expand the market for Africa's raw materials and natural
resources. 20 4 China's policy of noninterference in internal affairs and
its failure to insist on stringent conditions also attract African
leaders.20 5
China represents an alternative market and an
alternative source of aid for states in Africa, particularly those states
that have troubled relations with Western governments or are tired of
being ignored or neglected by the West.20 6 Few leaders have offered a
clear policy statement on the future of trade and investment relations
with China, and even fewer have made the issue of whether to trade
with China a matter for public discussion and deliberation. By
contrast, civil society activists are very critical of China's foray into
Africa. China's relations with Africa generated considerable debate
at the Seventh World Social Forum (WSF), held in Nairobi, Kenya, in
late January 2007.207 At a panel discussion organized by the semiofficial Chinese NGO Network for International Exchanges, attention
was given to the fact that China's involvement in Africa may
negatively affect local manufacturers and may not address
20 8
unemployment problems in the continent.

203.
Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 100 (noting that China has "no colonial
baggage" and "no residual political affiliations remaining from the Cold War").
204.
Id. at 101 (noting that China serves as an example to African state, and
observing that China "increased its appetite for natural resources," which has created
windfalls for many African countries who base their economies on the production of
commodities).
205.
Vines, supra note 195, at 63 (observing that China is "not vocal about
governance and human rights issues" and does not seek much conditionality).
206.
Id. (observing that "China engagement can provide African governments
that have troubled relationship with the West with an alternative axis of investment.").
207.
An annual meeting held by members of the movement, the World Social
Forum (WSF) is a platform for members and sympathizers to coordinate antiglobalization campaigns, share and refine organizing strategies, and share information.
See Wikipeida, World Social Forum, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiWorld_ SocialForum
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008). The meetings are usually in January to coincide and
perhaps overshadow the World Economic Forum that meets annually in Davos,
Switzerland. Id. The first WSF was held from 25 January to 30 January 2001 in Porto
Alegre. Id.; see also World Social Forum, http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/
index.php?cd-language=2&idmenu= (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). See generally JOSE
CORREA LEITE, THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUM: STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE (2005); Teivo

Teivainen, The World Social Forum and Global Democratisation:Learning from Porto
Alegre, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 621 (2002).
208.
Walden
Bello,
China
Provokes
Debate
in
Africa,
http://www.yesmagazine.org/article.asp?ID=1700 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).

YES!,
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Africa's Regional Organizations and China

The regional organizations in Africa have yet to issue clear
statements on policies that would guide their relationship with China
even though they appear enthusiastic over deepening relationships
with Beijing. 20 9
In its relationship with Africa, China has
emphasized bilateralism. 2 10 Consequently, multilateralism has been
somewhat neglected.
In his message during the 25th Summit of
Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) (held in Gaborone, Botswana), Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao stressed China's focus on developing relations with
SADC. He "pledged to push 'the cooperation between the two sides to
a new high.' 211
Indeed, China has appointed a permanent
representative to the SADC. 2 12 According to SADC, "the appointment
of the permanent representative is aimed at consolidating and
enhancing friendly relations and cooperation between China and
SADC. ''2 13 China has also expressed support for the New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 214 and NEPAD has not hesitated

209.
Salim Ahmed Salim, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), has "hailed China-Africa solidarity and called for concrete follow-up
actions to further expand Sino-African cooperation in diverse sectors." OAU Chief
Calls for Expansion of Sino-African Cooperation, PEOPLE'S DAILY (P.R.C.), Oct. 12,
2000, http://english.people.com.cnlenglish/200010/12/eng20001012_52437.html.
In his
statement at the closing of the 2000 meeting, Salim welcomed "the decision of the
forum to further consolidate China-Africa cooperation in order to establish within the
framework of South-South cooperation an enhanced and more dynamic partnership
based on equality and mutual benefit," and noted with satisfaction "the agreement of
the Ministers to undertake joint efforts to improve trade and investment opportunities
between China and Africa." Id.
210.
China is careful to remain not intrusive in its relationship with African
states, instead relying on the Five Principles. See Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 10001; see also supra note 31.
211.
Chinese Premier Congratulates SADC on Anniversary of Founding,
PEOPLE'S DAILY (P.R.C.), Aug. 17, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cni200508/17/
eng20050817_203051.html.
212.
China Appoints Permanent Representative to SADC, NAMIB. ECONOMIST,
Apr. 20, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com.nacontentview/ 384/331.
213.
Id.
214.
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a "vision and
strategic framework for Africa's renewal."
The New Partership for Africa's
Delevelopment, NEPAD in Brief, http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008) [hereinafter NEPAD in Brief]. NEPAD "is designed to address
the current challenges facing the African continent. Issues such as the escalating
poverty levels, underdevelopment and the continued marginalization of Africa needed a
new radical intervention, spearheaded by African leaders, to develop a new Vision that
would guarantee Africa's Renewal." Id.
China was very supportive at the high-level plenary meeting of the UN General
Assembly (held in New York on September 16, 2002), which convened to consider how
to support the New Partnership of Africa's Development (NEPAD). Tan Jiaxuan,
Chinese Foreign Minister, High-level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly to
Consider How to Support The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD):
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to accept the offer of economic aid from China. On July 26, 2006, the
Chinese Government handed a check for $500,000 to the CEO of the
NEPAD Secretariat, Professor Firmino Mucavele, at a handover
ceremony in Midrand, South Africa. 215 The grant money will be used
to support the Post-Graduate Training Program of African Nurses
and Midwives, to be launched in Tanzania and Kenya. 216 For China's
Ambassador to South Africa, Ambassador Liu, the handover
ceremony marked the first step of cooperation between China and
NEPAD. 217 In turn, Professor Mucavele-along with Madam Xu of
FOCAC-signed
the
Memorandum of
Understanding of
Strengthening Consultation and Cooperation between, NEPAD
Secretariat and Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Action
Committee of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).218 In
his November 4 address, President Hu Jintao promised that China
would continue to support Africa in implementing NEPAD and will
"support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves
'219
through unity and support the process of African integration.

Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations (Sept. 16,
2002), available at http://www.china-un.org/eng/ldhy571t28500.htm. In a speech
delivered at the meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan noted: "The state of
peace and development in Africa has its profound and complicated historical and
practical reasons and is largely due to the many unfair and unreasonable factors in the
current international political and economic order." Id. The Chinese Foreign Minister
also called on the international community to "create a sound international
environment for the economic development of African countries." Id. In his words:
The international community, especially the developed countries, have [sic] the
responsibility and obligation to adopt more active and effective measures to
reform the existing international economic, trading and financial systems, so as
to create a sound international environment for the economic development of
African countries. . . . In the process of the NEPAD's implementation, the
international community, developed countries in particular, should fully
respect African countries' own choice and reverse the trend of declining
development assistance as soon as possible. They should work to ensure that
their official development assistance account for 0.7% of their GNP, and should
reduce or cancel the debts of African countries, expand and improve the market
access for African countries and transfer applicable technologies to Africa.

Id.
215.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the P.R.C., The Chinese Government Grants
$500,000 to Support NEPAD Nurses and Midwives Post-GraduateTraining Program,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t265182.htm
[hereinafter
Chinese
Government's $500,000 Grant].
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
219.
President Hu Jintao's Address, supra note 3.
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D. Conclusion
Issued in early 2006, the coverage of China's Africa policy is
impressive. China's promise of a "win-win" relationship is tantalizing
220
to a continent with a long history of imperialism and exploitation.
A process of aggressive implementation of China's Africa policy has
already begun. In an address on November 4, 2006, President Hu
Jintao committed to take eight bold steps towards achieving the goals
enumerated in the Policy Paper. 22 1 Despite the opportunities that a
relationship with China presents for Africa, there is a need for
caution. African leaders must articulate the policies that will guide
this unfolding relationship and identify strategies that will enable the
continent to maximize the opportunities that such a relationship
presents. There is clearly a need to go beyond the rhetoric of mutual
support, equality, solidarity, and independence-to critically evaluate
what China-Africa relations hold for Africa and how Africa might
maximize this new opportunity. 22 2 A serious review of Sino-African

220.
Id.
221.
He committed to: doubling China's 2006 assistance to Africa by 2009;
providing US$3 billion of preferential loans and US$2 billion of preferential buyers'
credits to Africa in the next three years; establishing "a China-Africa development fund
which will reach US$5 billion to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa and
provide support to them"; building a conference centre for the African Union; cancelling
debt "in the form of all the interest-free government loans that matured at the end of
2005 owed by qualifying heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed
countries"; opening up China's market to Africa "by increasing from 190 to over 440 the
number of export items to China receiving zero-tariff treatment from the least
developed countries in Africa having diplomatic ties with China"; establishing three to
five trade and economic cooperation zones in Africa in the next three years; and
providing aid to help train professionals, address health problems, and establish
scholarship for African students to train in China. Id.
Over the next three years, he pledged to train 15,000 African professionals; send
100 senior agricultural experts to Africa; set up ten special agricultural technology
demonstration centres in Africa; build thirty hospitals in Africa; provide a grant of 300
million renminbi (RMB) to provide artemisinin (a drug used to treat malaria) and build
thirty malaria prevention and treatment centres to fight malaria in Africa; dispatch
300 youth volunteers to Africa; build 100 rural schools in Africa; and increase the
number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2000
per year to 4000 per year by 2009. Id.
Faced with strong Chinese interest in Africa in the 1960s, African
222.
nationalist leaders had to respond pragmatically and strategically. As Ogunsanwo
notes, 'Their response to Chinese initiatives . .. depended on how far they considered
their national interests would be served by dealing with China; what concessions the
Chinese were demanding and how compatible these were with their own aspirations;
how they perceived the 'real' interests of China in offering them economic and technical
aid; their own philosophy of development[,] and evaluation of the adequacy or
inadequacy of the Chinese model of development for their countries." OGUNSANWO,
supra note 143, at 2.
Commenting on the overall response of African leaders to Chinese interest in the
1960s, Hutchinson states: "Africans have shown tact and subtlety in their dealings
with China, and have made their own contributions to the relationship." HUTCHINSON,
supra note 22, at xii. He notes further:

542

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAZ LAW

[VOL. 41..505

trade arrangements is somewhat complicated by the fact that China
often presents its trade agreements, credit arrangements, and
development aid in a single package, wrapped in the friendly tissue
paper of "mutual support," "peaceful co-existence," and "non2 23
interference."
There is also a need to address the legal and institutional
foundations of this unfolding relationship.
An institutional
mechanism is needed to ensure that promises are translated into
action and that disputes are resolved equitably and in a timely
fashion. Although the two sides have agreed to "set up joint follow-up
mechanism[s] at various levels," much more is needed. 224 Pursuant
to the 2007-2009 Action Plan, the two sides have agreed to establish
new consultation and cooperation mechanisms 225 and to strengthen
existing mechanisms (such as bilateral commissions) between China
and Africa. 226 The two sides also agreed to "[p]roperly address, in a
spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, trade disputes
and
frictions
through
bilateral
or
multilateral
friendly

The European powers still felt they "knew what was best" for their former
colonies, that they would "rue the day" they had asked the Chinese in and that
nothing good could possibly come from a relationship with such dangerous and
unstable partners. They ignored the fact that leaders, who were successfully
able to manipulate them, the colonialists, out of power, were quite politically
mature enough to deal with the Chinese. At worst, the Chinese could be asked
to leave-as they were from a number of countries.
Id. at 106-07.
223.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 187 (noting that in the 1960s, Peking and
Moscow presented their trade agreements and medium-term credits in a "single,
businesslike package, wrapped in the friendly tissue paper of "peaceful coexistence"
and "non-interference in internal affairs" and that the impact of such offers can be
strong in a new country that is short on capital and is generally getting unfavorable
terms for its export sales in the West).
224.
Programmefor China-Africa Cooperation,supra note 89, 20.1.
225.
Beijing Action Plan, supranote 92, 2.2.2.
The two sides agreed to set up a mechanism of regular political dialogue
between foreign ministers of the two sides within the FOCAC framework. In
the following year of every FOCAC Ministerial Conference, foreign ministers
from the two sides will hold political consultation in New York on the sideline
of the UN General Assembly to exchange views on major issues of common
interest.
226.

Id.

2.2.3.

The two sides resolved to strengthen and give full play to existing mechanisms
between China and Africa, such as bilateral commissions, foreign ministries'
political consultation, mixed commissions on economic and trade cooperation,
and joint commissions on science and technology[;] expand their cooperation in
the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other international and
regional organizations[;] and actively explore ways of pragmatic cooperation
with third parties on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and win-win result.

20081

CHINA-AFRICA TRADE AND INVESTMENT. A CRITIQUE

543

consultations." 227 These provisions are extremely vague and raise
serious concerns. There are currently few rules stipulating the legal
obligations of the two sides, and no transparent review process is in
place to investigate and correct infractions when they occur.

V. THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

There is an ongoing struggle for control of Africa's resources.
Media reports suggest a frenzied competition over access to the
continent's resources. 228 Think tanks based in the West also report
an ongoing struggle between China and the West. 229 The driving
force behind this struggle is oil. As The Guardianreported in 2005,
"A new 'scramble for Africa' is taking place among the world's big
powers, who are tapping into the continent for its oil and
diamonds. '230 According to a 2005 Mail & Guardianreport, "China is
prowling the globe in search of energy resources. Oil executives and
diplomats have signed a flurry of deals, from Canada to Kazakhstan.
The scramble has triggered unease in Washington, where American
'23 1
conservatives worry about China's growing economic muscle."

227.
Id. 3.3.
228.
See generally Charlotte Denny, Scramble for Africa: Fear of Corruption and
Chaos in Oil Rush,
GUARDIAN
UNLIMITED
(U.K.),
June
13,
2003,
http://www.guardian.co.ukloil]story/0, 11319,979053,00.html
(noting
that:
"Washington's determination to find an alternative energy source to the Middle East is
leading to a new oil rush in sub-Saharan Africa which threatens to launch a fresh cycle
of conflict, corruption and environmental degradation in the region, campaigners warn
today"); Pascal Fletcher, China Muscles in to Africa Oil Scramble, REUTERS, Dec. 15,
2005; Christopher Thompson, The Scramble for Africa's Oil, NEW STATESMAN, June 14,
2007, http://www.newstatesman.com/200706180024 (discussing plans within the
Pentagon to reorganise military command structure in response to growing fears that
the United States is seriously ill-equipped to fight the war against terrorism in Africa
and noting that "[s]uddenly the world's most neglected continent is assuming an
increasing global importance as the international oil industry begins to exploit more
and more of the west coast of Africa's abundant reserves.").
See also JOHN
GHAZVINIAN, UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S OIL (2007); Rob Griffin, The
Economic
Scramble
for
Africa,
INDEP.
(U.K.),
Aug.
9,
2007,
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/analysis-and-features/article2846539.ece.
229.
See, e.g., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT NO. 56, MORE THAN
HUMANITARIANISM: A STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TOWARDS AFRICA 49-54 (2005),
available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/AfricaTaskForce_
Web.pdf [hereinafter MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM]; HURST, supra note 129; China's
Influence in Africa: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Human Rights, and
International Operations of the H. Comm. on InternationalRelations, 109th Cong. 5
(2005) (statement of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Africa, Global
Human Rights, and International Operations).
230.
David Leigh & David Pallister, Revealed: The New Scramble for Africa,
GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (U.K.), June 1, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/
0,,5205602-115645,00.html
231.
The Global Sweep to Mop up the World's Oil Resources, MAIL & GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Nov. 14, 2005.
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Reports published by U.S.-based think tanks also point to an ongoing
scramble for Africa's resources. These reports typically announce
China's recent foray into Africa with alarm and trepidation, suggest
that China is motivated by less-than-humanitarian ideals, and charge
that China's involvement will likely undermine human rights and
governance in Africa-ideals that Western governments, presumably,
are trying to institute in the continent. 232 The reports usually
2 33
conclude with calls for a revised U.S. strategy in Africa.
A July 2006 report by the Institute for the Analysis of Global
Security (IAGS) takes such an approach. 234 Authored by Cindy
Hurst, a Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy Reserve,
the report, China's Oil Rush in Africa, describes the activities of
China's oil companies throughout Africa and devotes a section to
examining the possible implications for the United States of China's
activity in Africa. 235 China's Oil Rush in Africa suggests that there
are positive and negative ramifications of China's increased
involvement in Africa. On the positive side, the report asserts that
China's involvement in oil exploration in Africa could lower oil
prices2 36 and bring revenue and expertise to underdeveloped
countries in the region. 23 7 On the negative side, the report claims
that "China's involvement in some countries could contribute to
instability by further enabling these countries to violate human
rights and partake in corrupt activities."238 More directly related to
the scramble, the report charges that "China's growing influence
is ...counterproductive to western objectives of promoting human
rights and abolishing corruption" 239 and concludes that "[s]hould

232.

See, e.g., Peter Brookes, Back to the Maoist Future: China's African

Ambitions, Apr. 17, 2006, available at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed041706a.cfm?RenderforPrint=l.
233.
See id. ("What is needed is a comprehensive U.S. strategy that encourages
democratic principles, human rights, free markets, and cooperation in regional security
and energy development in concert with like-minded partners, looking beyond
traditional European friends to democratic Asian and Latin American nations for
support.").
234.
See generally HURST, supra note 129 (relying on such an approach). The
IAGS describes itself as "a Washington-based non-profit public educational
organization dedicated to research and public debate on issues related to energy
security." See Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, http:// www.iags.org (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008).
235.
See generally HURST, supra note 129 (discussing China's oil-related
activities in Africa).
236.
Id. at 14 ("China's engagement in oil production in the region and its
investment in high risk countries could add new capacity to the world's tight energy
market and hence drive prices down.").
237.
Id. (noting that "the revenue and expertise that China brings could be
highly beneficial to underdeveloped countries in Africa" and that without this aid and
technology "some of those countries would be unable to realize the financial gain from
oil within their boundaries.").
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
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Countries in Africa choose to do business with China over the
U[nited] S[tates], it could have an impact on future U.S. oil
240
imports."
Another report published by the U.S. Council on Foreign

Relations (CFR)-More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S.
Approach Toward Africa-aims at identifying ways in which the U.S.
influence in Africa could be enhanced. 24 1 The report devotes one
chapter to the energy sector and another chapter to China. The
report notes that Africa "holds steadily increasing significance for
future U.S. energy supplies,"242 and that "[i]t is increasingly in the
'243
U.S. interest to locate new oil sources outside the Middle East.
The report charges that China "is acquiring control of natural
resource assets, outbidding Western contractors on infrastructure
projects, and providing soft loans and other incentive[s] to bolster its
competitive advantage. '244 The report further charges that China
"contributes to serious environmental damage in Africa, ' 2 45
undermines Africa's growth in the textile sector, 246 and offers
247
protection to rogue states.
Reports that foster the notion that China is bad for Africa and
that Western governments are good for the continent are myopic at
best and largely unhelpful. 2 48 Moreover, such reports ignore Africa's
dark history, particularly the continent's history of invasion,
annexation, and exploitation in the nineteenth century and the
continuing struggle between local communities and transnational oil
corporations based in the West. Barry Sautman has noted, "While
[China's] support for Sudan and Zimbabwe is much discussed in the
West, less is said about U.S. support for authoritarian African states,
especially oil producers such as Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, Chad and

240.

Id. at 16.

241.

See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 229.

242.
Id. at 28.
243.
Id.
244.
Id. at 40.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id. at 41 ("Perhaps most disturbing to U.S. political objectives is China's
willingness to use its seat on the UN Security Council to protect some of Africa's most
egregious regimes from international sanction, particularly Sudan and Zimbabwe.").
248.
See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 232 ("Across the planet, China is aggressively
seeking new friends and allies, and proving to be a less-demanding alternative to the
more scrupulous United States and European nations. Africa's traditional European
colonial and American partners now find their vision of a continent governed by freemarket democracies and the rule of law challenged by Beijing's scramble for influence
and resources."); Peter Brookes & Ji Hye Shin, China's Influence in Africa:
Implications for the United States, in BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington,
D.C., No. 1916, Feb. 2006) (observing that as China gains a foothold in Africa, "America
and its allies and friends are finding that their version of a prosperous Africa governed
by democracies that respect human rights and the rule of law and that embrace free
market is being challenged by the escalating Chinese influence in Africa.")
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Equatorial Guinea, support that extends even to Sudan through USSudan intelligence cooperation. '249 Given the stiff competition over
Africa's resources, what lessons may be learned from the history of
the earlier scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century? The period
between 1880 and 1930 was a tumultuous time in the history of
Africa. During that period, imperial powers conquered, occupied, and
eventually colonized almost the entire continent. 250 Although the
Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-1885 (Berlin Conference) is
often seen as marking the onset of the scramble for Africa, by 1880,
European powers had already acquired spheres of influence in the
251
continent and were quite interested in its commercial possibilities.
Through explorations, settlement, the establishment of commercial
posts, treaty-making with African leaders, and occupation of strategic
influence in the region
areas, European powers acquired considerable
252
power.
political
exercise
yet
as
but did not
Part V takes a brief look at the European scramble for Africa in
the nineteenth century and attempts to identify useful lessons that
may guide Africa and its leaders as the continent forges new interestbased relationships today.
253
A. The General Act of the Conference at Berlin (The Berlin Act)

The Berlin Conference took place between November 15, 1884,
and November 26, 1885.254 The primary aim of the conference was to
address territorial disputes and other issues that arose as a result of

249.
Sautman, supranote 167, at 7.
A. Adu Boahen, Africa and the Colonial Challenge, in GENERAL HISTORY OF
250.
AFRICA. VII: AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION 1880-1935, at 1, 1 (A. Adu Boahen
ed., 1985) (observing that "[niever in the history of Africa did so many changes occur
and with such speed as they did between 1880 and 1935." He notes that by 1880, as
much as 80% of the continent of Africa was ruled by African kings, clans, and lineage
heads and that "within the next thirty years, this situation underwent a phenomenal
and indeed a revolutionary change."); see also G.N. Uzoigwe, European Partition and
Conquest of Africa: An Overview, in GENERAL HISTORY OF AFRICA. VII: AFRICA UNDER
COLONIAL DOMINATION 1880-1935, supra, at 18, 18 (noting that "[tihe generation
following 1880 witnessed one of the most significant historical movements of modern
times. During this period Africa, a continent of over 28 million square kilometers was
partitioned, conquered and occupied effectively by the industrialized nations of
Europe.").
Uzoigwe, supra note 249, at 28-29 (observing that "[b]y the early 1880s, the
251.
Scramble was well under way" and that "[t]he news that such a conference would be
held increased the intensity of the Scramble.").
252.
Id. at 31
The General Act of the Congress at Berlin, Berlin, F.R.G., Feb. 26, 1885,
253.
http://ocid.nacse.org/qml/researchltfdd/toTFDDdocs/4ENG.htm
at
available
[hereinafter the Berlin Act].
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 31.
254.
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the European scramble for Africa. 255 At the Berlin Conference, the
African continent was effectively partitioned and distributed among
the European powers; resolutions were adopted regarding freedom of
trade and the free navigation of two chief rivers of Africa, the Niger
and the Congo; and rules regulating the occupation of territories were
established. 256 The Berlin Act, adopted on February 26, 1885,
embodied the doctrines of spheres of influence 257 and effective
occupation. 258 The welfare of Africans and the slave trade were given
only passing thought. 259 Chapter I of the Berlin Act ("Declaration
Relative to the Freedom of Trade in the Basin of the Congo") declared
the Congo Basin a free trade zone. 260 This freedom included free

255.
Id. at 28-29 (noting that Portugal proposed the calling of an international
conference to sort out the territorial disputes in the area of Central Africa on fears it
was pushed out of Africa).
256.
The first preamble of the Berlin Act reads:
WISHING, in a spirit of good and mutual accord, to regulate the conditions
most favourable to the development of trade and civilization in certain regions
of Africa, and to assure to all nations the advantages of free navigation on the
two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic Ocean.
Berlin Act, supra note 253.
257.
Sphere of influence as a term in international politics gained currency in
the latter part of the nineteenth century at the peak of European expansion into Africa
and Asia. See Daniel H. Deudney, Sphere of Influence, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9042397/sphere-of-influence (last visited
Feb. 16, 2008). Sphere of influence refers to "the claim by a state to exclusive or
predominant control over a foreign area or territory."
Id.
According to the
Encyclopedia Britannica, the term "may refer to a political claim to exclusive control,
which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a
legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from
interference within the sphere of influence." Id. As between the European powers,
agreements on spheres of influence were legal devices to ensure that the competition
for the colonies was carried out peacefully through agreed-upon procedures. The term
first appeared in a May 1885 agreement between Great Britain and Germany. Id. The
agreement provided for "a separation and definition of their respective spheres of
influence in the territories on the Gulf of Guinea." Id.; see also Wikipedia, Sphere of
Influence, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere-of influence (last visited Feb. 12, 2008)
(noting that a sphere of influence "is an area or region over which an organization or
state exerts some kind of indirect cultural, economic, military or political domination").
258.
Defined as uti possidetis (Latin for "as you possess"), effective occupation is
an international law principle "that territory and other property remains with its
possessor at the end of a conflict, unless provided for by treaty." Wikipedia, Uti
Possidetis, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiUti-possidetis (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). For
more information on "effective occupation," see generally Yekutiel Gershoni, The
Drawing of Liberian Boundaries in the Nineteenth Century: Treaties with African
Chiefs Versus Effective Occupation, 20 INT'L J. AFR. HIST. STUD. 293, 293-307 (1987).
259.
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 29 (noting that the Berlin Conference "passed
empty resolutions regarding the abolition of the slave trade and the welfare of
Africans"). Out of a total of thirty-eight articles, only one article (Article IX) was
devoted to issues relating to the slave trade, and only one article (Article VI) addressed
the welfare of natives. Berlin Act, supra note 253.
260.
According to Article 1 of the Berlin Act:
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access to the whole of the coastline of specified territories, 261 freedom
263
from taxes, 262 and freedom from import and transit dues.
Chapter VI of the Berlin Act ("Declaration Relative to the
Essential Conditions to be Observed in Order That New Occupations
on the Coasts of the African Continent May be Held to be Effective")
legitimized and legalized the doctrines of effective occupation and
spheres of influence. 264
Regarding the doctrine of effective
occupation, the Signatory Powers of the Berlin Act recognized "the
obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions
occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to
protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and

The trade of all nations shall enjoy complete freedom1.

In all the regions forming the basin of the Congo and its outlets. This
basin is bounded by the watersheds (or mountain ridges) of the adjacent
basins, namely, in particular, those of the Niari, the Ogow6, the Schari,
and the Nile, on the north; by the eastern watershed line of the affluents
of Lake Tanganyika on the east; and by the watersheds of the basins of
the Zambesi and the Log6 on the south. It therefore comprises all the
regions watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake
Tanganyika, with its eastern tributaries."

Berlin Act, supra note 253, art. I(1).
261.
Id. art. II.
All flags, without distinction of nationality, shall have free access to the whole
of the coastline of the territories above enumerated, to the rivers there running
into the sea, to all the waters of the Congo and its affluents, including the
lakes, and to all the ports situated on the banks of these waters, as well as to
all canals which may in the future be constructed with intent to unite the
watercourses or lakes within the entire area of the territories described in
Article I. Those trading under such flags may engage in all sorts of transport,
and carry on the coasting trade by sea and river, as well as boat traffic, on the
same footing as if they were subjects.
262.

Id. art. III.

Wares, of whatever origin, imported into these regions, under whatsoever flag,
by sea or river, or overland, shall be subject to no other taxes than such as may
be levied as fair compensation for expenditure in the interests of trade, and
which for this reason must be equally borne by the subjects themselves and by
foreigners of all nationalities. All differential dues on vessels, as well as on
merchandise, are forbidden.
Id.
263.
Id. art IV ('Merchandise imported into these regions shall remain free from
import and transit dues.").
264.
Id. art. XXXIV.
Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of
the African continent outside of its present possessions, or which, being
hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power
which assumes a Protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a
notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act,
in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.
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of transit under the conditions agreed upon. '26 5 The Berlin Act was
significant for the scant attention it paid to the interests, rights, and
welfare of Africans, as well as for the absence of Africans at the
negotiating table.
B. The Period of Treaty-Making
In the period immediately following the Berlin Conference,
European powers extended and consolidated their influence in Africa
through military conquest and treaty-making. The treaties took two
forms: those between Africans and Europeans, and those between the
European powers themselves. 26 6 The African-European treaties were
of two kinds. First, there were the commercial treaties and the slave
trade treaties. 26 7 Second, there were the political treaties "by which
African rulers either purportedly surrendered sovereignty in return
for protection, or undertook not to enter into treaty obligations with
other European nations." 26 8 One example of an African- European
treaty is the treaty between the Imperial British East African
Company (IBEAC) and Buganda.2 69 The African sovereign, Kabaka
Mwanga II, actively sought the protection and help of the IBEAC in
his struggle for power. 270 Although unwilling to give up his throne,

265.
Id. art. XXXV.
266.
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 31. Article VII of the agreement between Great
Britain and Germany of July 1, 1890, concerning East Africa, provided thus:
The two Powers engage that neither will interfere with any sphere of influence
assigned to the other by Articles I to IV. One Power will not in the sphere of
the other make acquisitions, conclude Treaties, accept sovereign rights or
Protectorates, nor hinder the extension of influence of the other. It is
understood that no Companies nor individuals subject to one Power can
exercise sovereign rights in a sphere assigned to the other, except with the
assent of the latter.
Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, art. VII. See generally Chanan Singh, The
Republican Constiution of Kenya, INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 878, 881 (1965).
267.
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 31
268.
Id. Of the political treaties, Uzoigwe observed:
They were made either by representatives of European governments or by
those of private organizations who later transferred them to their respective
governments. If a metropolitan government accepted them, the territories in
question were usually annexed or declared a protectorate;protectorate, if, on
the other hand, it suspected their authenticity, or if it felt constrained ... to
exercise caution, these treaties were used for bargaining purposes during the
bilateral European negotiations.
Id.
269.
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 32.
270.
In his letter to the company, he asked, "[B]e good enough to come and put
me on my throne." Id. In return he promised to repay the company with "plenty of
ivory and you may do any trade in Uganda and all you like in the country under me."
Id.
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Kabaka Mwanga II was willing to grant the Europeans unfettered
2 71
freedom to engage in commercial activities in his territory.
Territories were often fraudulently obtained.2 72 In return for false
promises of protection, African rulers signed away their kingdoms
and mortgaged their peoples for generations to come. The protection
treaties were so lopsided that Captain F.D. Lugard, a British colonial
administrator, wrote this letter in his diary:
No man if he understood would sign it, and to say that a savage chief
has been told that he cedes all rights to the company in exchange for
nothing is an obvious untruth. If he has been told that the company
will protect him against his enemies, and share in his wars as an ally,
he has been told a lie, for the company ha[s] no idea of doing any such
2 73
thing and no force to do it with if they wished.

C. Response of Africans and African Leaders to the Nineteenth
Century Scramble
Historians are divided on their interpretation of the attitude of
Africans towards the establishment of colonialism. Some historians
assert that many African tribes and rulers welcomed European rule
because of the peace that resulted. Noted African historian Margery
Perham writes:
[M]ost of the tribes quickly accepted European rule as part of an
irresistible order, one which brought many benefits, above all peace,
and exciting novelties, railways and roads, lamps, bicycles, ploughs,
new foods and crops, and all that could be acquired and experienced in
town and city. For the ruling classes, traditional or created, it brought
a new strength and security of status and new forms of wealth and
power. For many years after annexation, though, there was much
bewilderment, revolts were very few, and there does not appear to have
274
been much sense of indignity at being ruled.

Other historians forcefully argue that "an overwhelming majority of
African authorities and leaders were vehemently opposed to this
change and expressed their determination to maintain the status quo
and, above all, to retain their sovereignty and independence." 275 The
response of Prempeh 1 of Asante of Gold Coast (present day Ghana) is
a case in point. When the British offered him protection in 1891, he
replied:

271.
In his instruction to his emissaries to IBEAC, Kabaka Mwanga II stated, "I
do not want to give them . . . my land. I want all Europeans of all nations to come to
Uganda, to build and to trade as they like." Id.
272.
See id. (discussing how treaties were fraudulently obtained).
273.
1 THE DIARIES OF LORD LUGARD, EAST AFRICA, NOVEMBER 1889-DECEMBER
1890, at 318 (Margery Perham & Mary Bull eds., 1963).
274.
M. Perham, Psychology of African Nationalism, OPTIMA, X, I, at 27-36
(1960), reprinted in BOAHEN, supra note 250, at 9.
275.
BOAHEN, supra note 250, at 3.
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The suggestion that Asante in its present state should come and enjoy
the protection of her Majesty the Queen and Empress of India I may
say is a matter of very serious consideration, and which I am happy to
say we have arrived at this conclusion, that my kingdom of Asante will
never commit itself to such policy. Asante must remain as of old at the
same time to remain friendly with all white men. I do not write this in
a boastful spirit but in the clear sense of its meaning .... [T]he cause of
Asante is progressing and there is no reason for any Asante man to feel
alarm at the prospects or to believe for a single instant that our cause
276
has been driven back by the events of the past hostilities.

Wobogo, the Moro Naba (King of the Mossi), was even more forthright
in his rejection of an offer of protection. In 1895, he told Captain
Destenave, the French officer:
I know that the whites wish to kill me in order to take my country, and
yet you claim that they will help me to organize my country. But I find
my country good just as it is. I have no need of them. I know what is
necessary for me and what I want: I have my own merchants: also,
consider yourself fortunate that I do not order your head to be cut off.
277
Go away now, and above all, never come back.

What is evident is that while some African rulers forcefully resisted
European annexation and domination, others unwittingly welcomed
Europe's offer of protection and friendship. However, as Boahen
rightly notes, "[W]hatever strategy the Africans adopted, all of
them-with the sole exception of the Liberians and Ethiopiansfailed ... to maintain their sovereignty. 278
D. Lessons Learned
If not exactly a scramble, there is presently a strong competition
to secure Africa's natural resources, principally oil. 279 While military
conquest was used to further the goal of annexation and domination
of the continent in the nineteenth century, 280 military conquest is not
28 1
an overt part of the equation today.

276.
WEST AFRICAN RESISTANCE: THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO COLONIAL
OCCUPATION 43-44 (Michael Crowder ed., 1971).
277.
MICHAEL CROWDER, WEST AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL RULE 97 (1968).
278.
BOAHEN, supra note 250, at 13. Uzoigwe has asked, "Why were European
powers able to conquer Africa?" He attributes the victory to military superiority.
According to Uzoigwe, "European powers were able to conquer Africa with such relative
ease because in virtually every respect the dice was so heavily loaded in their favour."
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 38. Some of the factors that worked in the favor of the
Europeans included military superiority, overwlAming
material and financial
resources, and superior knowledge about Africa and its interiors (thanks to the
activities of European missionaries and explorers). Id. at 38-39.
279.
Sautman, supra note 167, at 7 (observing that Africa is the "most resourceladen continent" and is blessed with 'light, sweet, highly profitable crude oil" and that
there is a strong competition to secure African oil).
280.
Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 35-39 (observing that between 1885 and 1902,
European powers, particularly the French, pursed a policy of military conquest in
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In the nineteenth century, Western corporations and
governments often colluded with African chiefs to exploit Africa's
resources. 28 2 Similar practices continue today. Although much is
made of China's lack of scruples in its search for oil, Western
corporations are not innocent when it comes to a willingness to
engage in corrupt business practices in Africa. According to Simon
Taylor, director of Global Witness, "Western companies and banks
have colluded in stripping Africa's resources. We need to track
revenues from oil, mining[,] and logging into national budgets to
28s 3
make sure that the money isn't siphoned off by corrupt officials.
According to Charlotte Denny, economics correspondent with The
Guardian:
The new scramble for Africa risks bringing more misery to the
continent's impoverished citizens as Western oil companies pour
billions of dollars in secret payments into government coffers
throughout the continent. Much of the money ends up in the hands of
284
ruling elites or is squandered on grandiose projects and the military.

The economic concerns of the colonial Western powers prompted them
to meet at the Berlin Conference. 28 5 At the conference, and in the
resulting Berlin Act, the human rights and interests of Africans were

Africa. He notes, however, that Britain's military imperialism "was equally spectacular
and bloody").
281.
The announcement by Defense Secretary Robert Gates on February 6, 2007
of the creation of United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), a unified combatant
command for Africa, has raised concerns in many quarters. See Jim Garamone, DoD
Establishing U.S. Africa Command, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., Feb. 6, 2007
http://www.defenselink.millNewslNewsArticle.aspx?id=2940.
AFRICOM
will
be
operational by September 30, 2008 and will oversee military operations on the African
continent. Id.
In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Secretary Gates stated: "The President has decided to stand up a new, unified,
combatant command, Africa Command, to oversee security cooperation, building
partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and, if directed,
military operations on the African continent."
Id.
Presently, responsibility for
operations in Africa is divided among three combatant commands: U.S. European
Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM). Id. EUCOM has responsibility for most of the nations in the African
mainland except in the Horn of Africa. Id. CENTCOM has responsibility for Egypt,
Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, while PACOM has
responsibility for Madagascar, the Seychelles, and the Indian Ocean area off the
African coast. Id.; see also Prashad, supra note 167 (stating that although the
proximate issues used to push for AFRICOM were the ongoing crisis in Darfur and the
failure of the United States to act in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, "the less-talkedabout issue is the importance of African resources for the U.S. economy and for
multinational corporations. Oil is, of course, a central character in this story.").
282.
See supra text accompanying note 250.
283.
Share the World's Resources, Revealed: The New Scramble for Africa,
http://www.stwr.net/content/view/428/36 (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
284.
Denny, supranote 228.
285.
See Uzoigwe, supra note 250, at 29-31 (discussing the purposes of the
Berlin Conference).
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virtually ignored.28 6 The provision of the Berlin Act that addressed
28 7
the welfare of Africans was very paternalistic and lacked depth.
While European powers assumed the responsibility to "watch over the
preservation of the native tribes" 288 and to "care for the improvement
of the conditions of their moral and material well-being," 28 9 few rights
were expressly guaranteed to the Africans. 290 Today, the rights and
interests of Africa do not appear to feature strongly in the economic
calculations of African leaders and their trading partners.
29 1
Agreements are concluded in secret and rarely published.
The nineteenth century commercial and political agreements
between African leaders and European powers were concluded
without public scrutiny or participation. Today, trade and concession
agreements-some binding future generations-are also concluded
without any public involvement. 292 Such secrecy is unacceptable.
Openness and accountability are critical for stability and prosperity
in Africa. Presently, multinational companies-Western as well as
Chinese-are not required to disclose publicly their basic payments
for resources to their governments, which results in massive revenue
embezzlement. 293
Ordinary Africans, the real owners of the

286.
stated:

Article IX of the Berlin Act, the only Article to address slave trade, merely

Seeing that trading in slaves is forbidden in conformity with the principles of
international law as recognized by the Signatory Powers, and seeing also that
the operations, which, by sea or land, furnish slaves to trade, ought likewise to
be regarded as forbidden, the Powers which do or shall exercise sovereign
rights or influence in the territories forming the Conventional basin of the
Congo declare that these territories may not serve as a market or means of
transit for the trade in slaves, of whatever race they may be. Each of the
Powers binds itself to employ all the means at its disposal for putting an end to
this trade and for punishing those who engage in it.
Berlin Act, supra note 253, art. IX.
287.
Id. art. VI.
288.
Id.
289.
Id.
290.
The Act guaranteed only freedom of conscience and religious toleration. Id.
Although this right was extended to natives, the primary concern was the protection of
missionaries and their work. Thus, Article VI(b) states that "Christian missionaries,
scientists[,] and explorers, with their followers, property and collections, shall likewise
be the objects of especial protection." Id.
291.
GLOBAL WITNESS, TIME FOR TRANSPARENCY: COMING CLEAN ON OIL,
MINING
AND
GAS
REVENUES
92
(2004),
http://www.globalwitness.org/
medialibrary-get.php/186/report.rtf (commenting that the "extreme secrecy clauses"
build into oil concessions agreement ensure that proper public accounting is
impossible); Nicholas Miranda, Note, Concession Agreements: From Private Contract to
Public Policy, 117 YALE L.J. 510, 519 (2007) (noting that government officials limit
public involvement in concession agreements by disseminating little information about
bid selection procedures and withholding the existence of concession agreements until
they become binding).
292.
GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 291, at 92; Miranda, supra note 291, at 519.
293. GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 291, at 5.
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resources, are left dispossessed and reliant on donor assistance. 29 4 In
a report that looked at the problem in five countries, including three
countries in Africa, 295 Global Witness concluded:
In these countries, governments do not provide even basic information
about their revenues from natural resources. Nor do oil, mining[,] and
gas companies publish any information about payments made to
governments ....

Investigations ...

reveal that some companies have

played a willing role in facilitating off-the-books payments,
misappropriation of state assets, and other nefarious activities such as
arms shipments, as part of an anti-competitive, under-the-table method
of winning business with unaccountable regimes ....

The end result is

a litany of corruption, social decay, increased poverty, reinforcement of
authoritarian government[J and political unrest, which can ultimately
296
lead to state failure and the spread of instability across regions.

African leaders should involve their citizens in discussions about
future direction of trade and investment in the continent. Ideally, the
terms of trade and investment agreements should be readily available
for public scrutiny and comment before they are concluded.
Thus far, natural resources in Africa have left a legacy of
conflict, corruption, poverty, serious abuses of human rights, and
environmental degradation. 2 97 Critics worry that increased trade
between China and Africa may erode democratic gains made in Africa
since the 1990s. 298 Africans remain spectators to arrangements and
agreements that fundamentally affect their lives. While nineteenthcentury African chiefs may have acted in ignorance in concluding
lopsided treaties that offered no tangible benefit to Africa, ignorance
is not an acceptable excuse today. Sadly, African leaders who
resisted the annexation and domination of the continent in the
nineteenth century were dismissed as being romantic and shortsighted. 299 African leaders must reject terms of engagement that

294.
Id. at 6.
295.
The five countries investigated were Kazakhstan, Congo Brazzaville,
Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Nauru. Id. at 4.
296.
Id.
297.
See id. at 21 ("Oil wealth [in Africa] has left a legacy of corruption, poverty
and conflict.").
298.
See Wilson Testimony, supra note 169, at 11.
It is clear that neither democracy nor transparency have much standing in
China's policy repertoire. China has a consistent policy of not imposing explicit
political conditionalities on its aid recipients. Their philosophy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations fits well with the policy
preference of many African heads of state. Trade trumps transparency.
299.
BOAHEN, supra note 250, at 12.
Africa, Oliver and Fage assert:

In their 1962 book, A Short History of

If these [African rulers] were far-sighted and well-informed, and more
particularly if they had had access to foreign advisers such as missionaries or
traders they might well understand that nothing was to be gained by
resistance, and much by negotiation. If they were less far-sighted, less
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undermine human rights and sustainable development, as well as
arrangements that do not advance Africa's economic interest. Is a
win-win trade relation conceivable?
The jury is still out.
Nevertheless, relationships that simultaneously depict sub-Saharan
Africa as the object of charitable concern while removing billions of
dollars of natural resources are no longer acceptable and must be
30 0
seriously probed.
To date, corruption has crippled Africa and is destroying present
and future generations in a continent otherwise blessed with an
abundance of natural resources.30 1 A clear and transparent legal and
30 2
regulatory framework is necessary to curb this corruption.
Corruption and the lack of transparency currently discourage the
adoption of appropriate laws and regulations to inhibit malfeasance,
fraud, financial-sector abuses, and diversion of government budget
revenues. 30 3
Transparency by governments and companiesparticularly in key sectors of the economy-as well as enhanced
public financial management and accountability must be the
cornerstone of the unfolding relationship between China and Africa.

fortunate, or less well-advised, they ... would themselves assume an attitude
of resistance, which could all too easily end in military defeat, the deposition of
chiefs, the loss of land to the native allies of the occupying power, possibly even
to the political fragmentation of the society or state.
ROLAND OLIVER & J.D. FAGE, A SHORT HISTORY OF AFRICA 203 (1962).
300.
Leigh & Pallister, supra note 230 (observing that while Africa is the object
of the West's charitable concern, billions of pounds' worth of natural resources are
being removed from it, and revealing the findings of a Guardian investigation that
instead of enriching often debt-ridden countries in Africa, some big corporations are
facilitating corruption and provoking instability-so much so that organizations such
as Friends of the Earth talk of an "oil curse").
301.
According to the U.S. Ambassador to Chile:
Corruption jeopardizes free markets and sustainable growth. It provides
sanctuary to the forces of global terror. It facilitates the illicit activities of
international and domestic criminals. It saps the legitimacy of democratic
economies and can, in its extreme forms, threaten democracy itself. It also
diverts public investment away from areas such as public sector modernization
and social development-including education and health care-and into
projects where bribes and kickbacks are more readily available. Dishonest,
corrupt, and unethical behavior among public officials undermines the trust
and confidence of the people that government can do "good" and advance the
public interest.
Craig A. Kelly, Ambassador to Chile, Statement to APEC Meeting of Government
Anticorruption Experts (Sept. 25, 2004), available at http://canberra.usembassy.govl
hyper2004/0928/epf2O4.htm.
302.
In NEPAD's framework document, African leaders pledged to take joint
responsibility for "instituting a transparent legal and regulatory framework for
financial markets and the auditing of private companies and the public sector." New
Partnership for Africa's Development, Framework Document, Oct. 2001, 49, available
at
http://www.nepad.org/2OO5/files/documents/inbrief.pdf
[hereinafter
NEPAD
Framework Document]
303.
Kelly, supra note 301.
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African countries should immediately ratify the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and facilitate timely
implementation of the treaty. UNCAC provides a comprehensive
framework for fighting corruption with its emphasis on prevention,
30 4
criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery.
Transparency in the energy and extractive sector is very important.
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI)30 5 and other
similar initiatives should play a critical role in investment relations
30 6
between China and Africa.

304.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 7,
2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/conventioncorruption/signing/
Convention-e.pdf.
Announced in September 2002 by British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the
305.
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, September 2002, EITI
"supports improved governance in resource-rich countries through the full publication
and verification of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and
Initiative, EITI Summary,
Extractive Industries Transparency
mining."
http://www.eitransparency.org/eiti/summary (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
To date, about fifteen African countries have either endorsed, or are now actively
implementing, EITI. See Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Implementing
Countries, http://www.eitransparency.org/implementingcountries (last visited Feb. 18,
2008) (showing a complete list of EITI countries). The countries in Africa implementing
EITI are Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and
Sierra Leone. Id.
An EITI Source Book developed by the EITI Secretariat provides guidance for
countries and companies wishing to implement the initiative. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES
available
at
BOOK
(2005),
INITIATIVE,
SOURCE
TRANSPARENCY
Participants
http://www.eitransparency.org/files/document/sourcebookmarch05.pdf.
Principle 1 emphasizes EITI
must embrace the twelve core EITI principle.
participants' shared "belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should be
an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to sustainable
development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, can create negative
economic and social impacts." Id. at 8. Principle 4 "underline[s] the importance of
transparency by governments and companies in the extractive industries and the need
to enhance public financial management and accountability." Id. Participants also
express belief "in the principle and practice of accountability by government to all
citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure" (Principle 7),
as well as commitment to "encouraging high standards of transparency and
accountability in public life, government operations and in business" (Principle 8). Id.
306. Another noteworthy initiative is the Group of Eight's (G8) FIGHTING
CORRUPTION AND IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY-A G8 ACTION PLAN (2003), available at
http://www.g8.fr/evian/extras/506.pdf [hereinafter G8 TRANSPARENCY ACTION PLAN].
The Evian Declaration is the G8's first specific statement on the importance of
transparency of natural resource revenues and was welcomed by the Publish What You
Pay (PWYP) international coalition of NGOs. Press Release, Publish What You Pay,
G8 Must Follow Declaration on Oil, Gas and Mining Transparency withWith Action
available
at
http://pwyp.gn.apc.org/english/pdf/releases/
(June
2,
2003),
pwyp_020603.pdf. The Declaration outlines the G8's commitments to take necessary
steps to combat bribery, help recover and return stolen assets, and deny safe havens
for corrupt officials. G8 TRANSPARENCY ACTION PLAN, supra, at 2. A few countries
have been invited to undertake pilot partnerships in support of G8 anticorruption and
transparency programs. Peru, Georgia, and Nicaragua are a few of the Countries that
have agreed to participate in the pilot. Neil Levine, Chief, Governance Division Office,
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VI. CHINA-AFRICA RELATIONS: CRITICAL APPRAISAL AND A MODEST
PROPOSAL

An assessment of Africa's relationship with China must be
carried out against the backdrop of past and present scrambles for
energy and strategic minerals in the continent. China-Africa trade
relations must also be assessed against the backdrop of growing
South-South trade and investment, 30 7 since developing countries are
308
trading and investing more among themselves than ever before.
Finally, China-Africa trade and investment relations must be
assessed in light of the shrinking opportunities for growth-enhancing
trade between Africa and its traditional trading partners in the
North, as well as the continent's dire need for new trade and
investment opportunities. 30 9 As John Donnelly aptly notes, "[T]he
Chinese . . . are making strategic economic inroads into a continent
that, outside of oil investment, has long been written off by most
Western companies as too risky because of poor governance or threat
310
of conflict.

DCHA, USAID, Report Before the USAID Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign
Aid 10 (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.usaid.gov/about-usaid/acvfa/
acvfafullreptfeb2005.pdf.
307.
Since the decolonization period in the 1950s and 1960s, commerce between
developed countries and the developing countries of the South has dominated world
trade. However, since 2000 the world has witnessed a massive increase in trade and
investment flows between Asia and Africa. According to a recent World Bank report:
The acceleration of South-South trade and investment is one of the most
significant features of recent developments in the global economy .... Today,
Asia receives about 27[%] of Africa's export, in contrast to only about 14[%] in
2000. This volume of trade is now almost at par with Africa's export to the
United States and the European Union (EU)-Africa's traditional trading
partners ....
Asia's exports to Africa also are growing very rapidly-about
18[%] per annum-which is higher than to any other region.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 1-2.
308. According to Supachai Panitchpakdi:
Today, developing countries are trading and investing more, and doing so
increasingly among themselves. In just 10 years-between 1995 and 2005-the
share of the South in global merchandise trade increased from 27.6% to 36%.
Developing countries now account for nearly one fourth of world imports of
commercial services, and are seeing a large and ever-expanding share of the
US, Japan and EU export markets. In one year alone-2004-South-South
trade soared by 14.6%, and has now outpaced total world trade growth. SouthSouth trade is also becoming more complementary and more diversified,
moving from primary commodities to manufactures and high-end services.
Panitchpakdi, supranote 69.
309. BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that over the period from 2000-2005,
the EU's share of Africa's exports has been cut in half).
310.
John Donnelly, China Scooping Up Deals in Africa as US Firms Hesitate,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2005, at A-1.
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Africa needs new trade partners. The continent is also in dire
need of FDI and technical assistance. While China-Africa trade and
investment relations present Africa with immense opportunities to
address her pressing needs, there are serious challenges, too. The
challenge for Africa in its relationship with China is threefold. First,
Africa must seek to maximize the opportunities without giving up
fundamental values that are only now taking root in the continent.
Second, Africa must avoid mistakes made during the colonial era that
led to exploitation and balkanization of the continent. Finally, Africa
must ensure that human beings, particularly Africa's poor, are not
sacrificed at the altar of economic growth. Part V of this Article
identifies and analyzes the potential gains and pitfalls of the
unfolding relationship between Africa and China. The Author also
offers suggestions for an African-China policy.
A. China-Africa Relations:PotentialGain for Africa
1.

Africa's Need for New Trade Opportunities

Examination of Africa's trade performance over the past decade
reveals a need for new trade opportunities. First, although Africa has
witnessed an overall increase in its trade relative to gross domestic
product, 3 11 Africa's share in world exports has fallen. 3 12 According to
a 2004 report from UNCTAD, Africa's share in world exports fell from
about 6% in 1980 to 2% in 2002, and its share of world imports fell
from about 4.6% in 1980 to 2.1% in 2002. 313 Also of concern is
Africa's heavy dependence on primary commodities as a source of
export earnings. 314 Today, Sub-Saharan Africa "is the only region of
the world that has not exhibited an increasing share of non-oil
exports over the last two decades. '3 15 The share of manufactured
exports in Africa's total merchandise exports has increased by only
10% since the 1980s. 3 16 Overall, compared to other regions such as

311.
See U.N. Conference on Trade &and Dev., Economic Development in Africa:
Issues in Africa's Trade Performance, T 1, U.N. Doc. TDIB/5016 (July 28, 2003),
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tb5Od6&cl-en.pdf [hereinafter Economic
Development in Africa] (reporting that trade as a share of GDP for sub-Saharan Africa,
excluding South Africa and Nigeria, increased from 45.0% to 50.4% between 1980-1981
and 2000-2001); see also U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Economic Situation
and Prospects 2007, at 9, available at http://www.unctad.org/ enldocs/wesp2007_en.pdf
[hereinafter World Economic Situation and Prospects] (noting that economic growth in
Africa "has maintained a strong pace, reaching almost 5.6 per cent in 2006").
312.
Economic Development in Africa, supra note 311, 1.
313.
Id.
314.
Id.
2 (observing that Africa depends more on primary commodities as a
source of export earnings than any other developing region).
315.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 7-8.
316.
Economic Development in Africa, supra note 311, 5.
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Asia and Latin America, Africa has not benefited from the boom in
manufactured exports.3 17 What boom the continent has experienced
has been concentrated in a few countries. According to UNCTAD:
While the value of Africa's manufactures increased by 6.3[%] annually,
this seemingly high growth is about half the growth rates recorded by
Asia (14[%]) and Latin America (about 12[%]) and is from a relatively
low base. It is also the result of significant growth in labour-intensive
and resource-based semi-manufactures from a few countries, in
particular Mauritius (garments) and Botswana (rough diamonds). 3 1 8

Africa's commodity dependence means vulnerability to weather
conditions and market vagaries and frequently results in terms-oftrade losses. 319
Price volatility also "aggravates difficulties in
macroeconomic management" and "frustrates investment efforts as it
increases uncertainty about overall economic conditions, including
'320
exchange rates, returns on investment, and import capacity.
Third, even in the fuel sector where Africa enjoys comparative
advantages, the continent has fallen behind other developing
countries in the export of non-fuel primary commodities. 32 1 Fourth,
322
for most countries in Africa, market access remains a problem.
Because most of the tariff peaks are in agriculture and average
agricultural tariffs are higher than tariffs on manufactured products,
Africa suffers disproportionately given the region's dependence on
323
commodities export.

The continent's share in world merchandise exports fell from 6.3[%] in 1980 to
2.5[%] in 2000 in value terms. . . . Similarly, its share of total developingcountry merchandise exports fell to almost 8[%] in 2000, nearly a third of its
value in 1980, while the share of world manufactured exports remained a little
below 1[%].").
317.
Id. 4.
318.
Id.
7.
319.
Id. 2; see also World Economic Situation and Prospects, supra note 311, at
7 (observing that because of their narrow production and resources bases, the majority
of LDCs remain vulnerable to weather shocks and are highly dependent on
developments in commodity markets).
320.
Economic Development in Africa, supra note 311, 26.
321.
Id. 7 (observing that Asia outperformed other developing regions in nonfuel commodity exports between 1980 and 2000). According to UNCTAD:
The trends . . . indicate that most African countries have been losing market
shares in commodity exports to other developing countries, while at the same
time most have been unable to diversify into manufactured exports. Africa's
difficulties in maintaining market shares for its traditional commodities derive
from its inability to overcome structural constraints and modernize its
agricultural sector, combined with [its] high cost of trading.

Id.

9.
322.
323.

Id.
16.
See id. (noting that most tariff peaks are in agriculture).
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Overall, as a result of a host of factors, including small and

shallow markets, underdeveloped market institutions, restricted
market access, constraints on business competition, and poor
regulatory climate, Africa "has not taken full advantage of
international trade to leverage growth. '324 Trade with Asian
countries, particularly China, may open up new opportunities for
Africa. According to the World Bank,
Africa's exports to China and India have grown 1.7 times the growth
rate of the continent's total exports worldwide. Between India and
China, it is China that is the more dynamic destination market for
Africa's exports. Exports to China grew by 48[%] annually between
1999-2004, compared to 14[%] for India. Ten percent of Sub-Saharan
exports are now to China, and some 3[%] are to India. China has
32 5
overtaken Japan as the leading importer of African products in Asia.

Apart from the increase in the volume of African exports to China,
trade with China may stimulate diversification and export of non-fuel
products.
Increasingly, labor-intensive raw and semi-processed
agricultural commodities that are used for further processes are also
exported to China. 326 In 2006, China promised to further open its
market to Africa. 327 Concomitantly, China pledged to increase the
number of export items that would be eligible for zero-tariff
treatment (i.e., when exported from least-developed countries to
China)from 190 to over 440.328 It also pledged to launch bilateral
negotiations with countries concerned with the early conclusion and
implementation of related agreements. 329
2.

Africa's Need for New Investment Opportunities

Africa urgently needs FDI. FDI provides the resources needed
to finance sustained economic growth over the long term. 330 Although
324.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
325.
Id. 11.
326.
Id. 12.
327.
See id. at 19 (heralding the January 2006 release of "China's Africa Policy"
which "identifies a large set of economic issues over which China proposes to cooperate
with Africa, including trade, investment, debt relief, economic assistance, finance,
agriculture, and infrastructure").
328.
Chang Ai'ling, China, Africa Build New Partnership on Old Ties, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.), Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2007-10/02/content_6821758_1.htm.
329.
Beijing Action Plan, supra note 92, 3.3.
330.
Monterrey Consensus, supra note 77, 20.
Private international capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment,
along with international financial stability, are vital complements to national
and international development efforts .... [FDI] is especially important for its
potential to transfer knowledge and technology, create jobs, boost overall
productivity, enhance competitiveness and entrepreneurship, and ultimately
eradicate poverty through economic growth and development.
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FDI inflow as a percentage of Africa's gross fixed capital formation
increased to 19% in 2005,331 Africa's current share of global FDI is
negligible-it stands at about 3%.332 Outward FDI from the region as
a whole is in decline. 333 Several factors-including lack of productive
capacity, small regional markets, and lack of diversification into nonagricultural sectors-account for the steady decline in Africa's share
4
in global FDI since the 1980s.3
China represents a new and growing source of FDI inflow to
Africa.3 35 According to media reports, China has now signed a
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with twenty-eight African
countries, and it has signed Agreements for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes
on Income with eight African countries. 33 6 With the increase in FDI
from China comes a new aid-investment nexus that could stimulate
human resource development in Africa. Indeed, the 2004-2006
China-Africa Inter-governmentalHuman Resources Development Plan
(2004-2006 Human Resources Plan), adopted after the second
Ministerial Conference of the Forum, has now been successfully
implemented. 337 Pursuant to the 2004-2006 Human Resources Plan,
China trained over ten thousand African professionals in various
fields under the African Human Resources Development Fund
(AHRDF). 33 8 The Chinese government has also pledged to continue to
provide specific training of professionals and management personnel
for African countries in response to their needs, as well as to train
fifteen thousand professionals for African countries in the next three
339
years.
Overall, Chinese investment in Africa could help diversify
Africa's export base, strengthen the continent's domestic production
capacity, and shape Africa's economic relations with the rest of the
world in the years to come. Whether Africa can maximize the
opportunities that the growing relationship with China presents is
debatable. With the service and manufacturing sectors dominating
outward FDI flows from developing countries, Africa's weak

331.
World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 40 (noting that total FDI
inflows into Africa "surged to reach $31 billion in 2005, representing a historic growth
rate of 78%").
332.
Id. at 40.
333.
Id.
334.
Id. at 41.
335.
See id. at 42 ("The key source countries of FDI inflows to Africa have
remained the same for years, but investment from China and other Asian
economies ... increased, especially in the oil and telecom industries.").
336.
China-Africa Trade Hits US$55.5 Billion in 2006, supra note 114.
337.
Beijing Action Plan, supra note 92, 5.2.1.
338.
Id.
339.
Id. 5.2.2.
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manufacturing and service base may make Africa an unattractive
340
market for Chinese investors.
3.

Africa's Need for Trade-Related Technical Assistance

Compared to other developing regions, Africa has been unable to
modernize its agricultural sector, tap into cheaper finance, increase
capital resources and skill, or develop efficient trade-facilitating
342
infrastructural bases. 341 Africa suffers from a weak private sector.
Countries in Africa "lack a strong institutional capacity to provide the
necessary support services to producers and exporters." 34 3 In short,
even with increased market access and lower tariffs, most African
countries may not be able to benefit from global trade unless supplyside constraints to trade and investment are addressed. 344 To benefit
from the open global economy, most countries in Africa must enhance
their supply and trading capacities. The continent needs adequate
financial resources that can enable states to remove supply-side
constraints through investments in trade production capacity, human
resources and institutions, infrastructure, and technology.
Although world leaders have pledged to promote increased aid
for building the trade and productive capacities of developing
countries, 34 5 Africa's relationship with China holds a lot of promise.

World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 115 (observing that the service
340.
sector accounted for 81% of the total FDI stock of the developing and transition
economies in 2004).
11 (observing that
See Economic Development in Africa, supra note 311,
341.
the continent has underdeveloped and unreliable road and railway networks and
communication links as well as outdated information technology.).
10 ("Africa has also not been able to tap into cheaper finance,
342. See id.
efficient logistics, and increased capital resources and skills .....
343.
Id. 11.
344.
See World Economic Situation and Prospects, supra note 311, at 52
("[T]here is now overwhelming evidence that many developing countries require not
only lower tariffs or improved market entry conditions but also enhanced supply and
trading capacities in order to benefit from the open, global economy through the
production and trading of competitive goods and services."); World Trade Org., Aid for
Trade, http:/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/aid4tradee.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2008) ("Many poor countries lack the basic infrastructure to take advantage of the
market access opportunities resulting from a successful outcome to the Doha Round of
trade negotiations."). For developing countries, particularly the least-developed
countries, the importance of increased market access cannot be ignored, however. At
the United Nations World Summit in 2005, leaders pledged to "work towards the
objective . . . of duty-free and quota-free market access for all least developed countries'
products to the markets of developed countries, as well as to the markets of developing
countries in a position to do so" and also to "support their efforts to overcome their
supply-side constraints." 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 76, 1 29.
345.
See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 76, 30 ("We are committed
to supporting and promoting increased aid to build productive and trade capacities of
developing countries and to taking further steps in that regard, while welcoming the
substantial support already provided.").
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China has promised to "step up China-Africa cooperation in
transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity[,] and
other infrastructures."3 46 Under the 2007-2009 Action Plan, China
has committed to send one hundred senior experts on agricultural
technologies to Africa and to establish ten demonstration centers of
agricultural technology in Africa.3 4 7 China has also undertaken to
establish cooperation with Africa in extending applicable agricultural
technologies and human resource training.3 48 The important point to
note is that China is providing assistance in areas that Western aid
3 49
agencies and private investors have long neglected.

At the level of the World Trade Organization, there has been much talk on traderelated capacity building for developing countries, particularly LDCs. At the Sixth
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in December 2005, trade ministers endorsed the
Aid for Trade Initiative and gave the WTO Director General a mandate to create a
Task Force to provide recommendations on how to operationalize Aid forFor Trade.
World Trade Org., Implementing Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/implementing-par57_e.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2008). According to Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration:
We welcome the discussions of Finance and Development Ministers in various
fora, including the Development Committee of the World Bank and IMF, that
have taken place this year on expanding Aid for Trade. Aid for Trade should
aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side
capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to
implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand
their trade. Aid for Trade cannot be a substitute for the development benefits
that will result from a successful conclusion to the DDA, particularly on market
access. However, it can be a valuable complement to the DDA. We invite the
Director-General to create a task force that shall provide recommendations on
how to operationalize Aid for Trade. The Task Force will provide
recommendations to the General Council by July 2006 on how Aid for Trade
might contribute most effectively to the development dimension of the DDA.
We also invite the Director-General to consult with Members as well as with
the IMF and World Bank, relevant international organisations and the regional
development banks with a view to reporting to the General Council on
appropriate mechanisms to secure additional financial resources for Aid for
Trade, where appropriate through grants and concessional loans.
World Trade Org.,Organization, Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(05)/DEC
(Dec. 18, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/minist_e/minO5_e/
finaltexte.htm#aid for trade
346.
China's African Policy, supranote 8, pt. IV, sec. 2.5.
The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in
transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other
infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate
in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts,
and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual
projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management
cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.
347.
348.
349.

Beijing Action Plan, supra note 92, 3.1.3.
Id.
According to a 2005 report by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations:
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B. Africa's China Policy: A Modest Proposal
What principles ought to guide the relationship between Africa
and China going forward? This Subpart identifies several issues that
should be in the minds of policy-makers in Africa as they contemplate
a trade and investment relationship with China.
1.

Proactivity

Africa must learn from the mistakes of the past. During the
colonial era, African states were mere spectators, and they suffered
for it. Africans cannot afford to be passive observers of this unfolding
relationship between the continent and China. Africans and African
leaders must "proactively identify how to maximise the opportunities
and the potential know-how China presents." 350 This requires the
active involvement of Africa's civil society, including scholars,
members of the private sector, trade unions, and women's groups.
Proactivity calls for a careful review of actual market conditions in
China. What "at-the-border" and "behind-the-border" rules and
regulations in China could operate as effective barriers to African
export? What tariffs do African exporters face in China? How might
non-tariff barriers in China affect African exports? These questions
are important because, according to the World Bank, African exports
face relatively high tariffs in Asia. 35 1 The overall tariff effectiveness
on African imports in Asian countries "is in part a reflection of the
lack or limited scope of Asian preferences granted to Africa compared
to those granted by the United States and EU. '352 What is perhaps
shocking is that "[a]mong Asian countries, the tariff levels of China
and India on African products remain high. '353 Specifically, in China

China is . . . investing and providing assistance in areas that Western aid
agencies and private investors have long neglected: physical infrastructure,
industry, and agriculture. USAID has not funded heavy infrastructure project
since the late 1970s. Both USAID and the World Bank reduced assistance to
agriculture by as much as 90[%] in the 1990s. Yet these are areas that are once
again recognized as essential for Africa's growth. U.S. companies are also most
heavily invested in the extractive industries, whereas Chinese companies are
eager to go into many other fields.
MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM, supra note 229, at 48.
Moeletsi Mbeki, Deputy Chairman, S. Afr. Inst. of Int'l Aff., Address at the
350.
China in Africa in the 21st Century: Preparing for the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation Conference (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://saiia.org.zalimages/uploadl
Moeletsi%20_China_in_Africa.pdf.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 130 ("Although Asian tariffs for Africa are
351.
gradually declining, the trend is very weak, especially for exports from African least
developed countries (LDCs).").
Id.
352.
Id. at 131.
353.
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3 54
as well as in India, tariff rates on agricultural products are high.
Although China has a zero tariff on raw materials for which there is
3 55
high demand, it places moderate to high tariffs on other imports.
High tariffs, particularly on agricultural products, are troubling as
356
they have the tendency to discourage African exports.
Tariff peaks and escalations in the Asian market are another
cause of concern that must be closely monitored. 357 According to the
World Bank, tariff escalation "is quite visible in Asian markets on
some of the leading exports from Africa. '358 Tariff escalations in
China discourage processing activities in Africa,3 59 and they result in
360
Africa's continued dependence on primary production.
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are another area that calls for
vigilance on the part of African governments. For Africa, certain
circumstances may subvert the expected gains from trade; these
circumstances include the increase of sanitary and phytosanitary
technical measures in many countries, the fact that most technical
measures in other countries are applied to agricultural products (the
primary export from Africa), 361 and the fact that developed countries
and Asia have doubled their technical measures. 3 62 The World Bank
has noted that African countries "overall carry a higher NTB burden
than any other continent because the majority of [least developed

354.
Id.
355.
Id. at 132.
356.
See id. at 134 ("High Indian and relatively high Chinese tariffs on
agricultural products are of particular concern as higher tariff rates tend to be applied
to the products in which African countries have growth potential.").
357.
Id. at 135 ("Asia's tariff structure consists of many peaks and escalations.").
Tariff peaks arise when a government maintains excessively high tariffs on products
that the government considers sensitive in order to protect domestic producers. Id.
Tariff escalation is a term used to describe a situation where an importing country,
with a goal of protecting its processing or manufacturing industry, sets low tariffs on
imported raw materials used by the industry but sets higher tariffs on finished
products in order to protect the goods produced by the industry. Id. at 137.
358.
Id.
359.
Id.; World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO, Some Issues Raised,
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/dev4_e.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2008) (noting that when importing countries escalate their tariffs, "they make it more
difficult for countries producing raw materials to process and manufacture value-added
products for export.").
360.
See NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302,
153 (noting that
African economies are vulnerable because of their dependence on primary production
and resource-based sectors, and urging that "[vialue-added in agro-processing and
mineral beneficiation must be increased and a broader capital goods sector developed
through a strategy of economic diversification based on intersectoral linkages.").
361.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 145 ("LDCs carry a higher than average
burden of NTBs because they export mainly agricultural products.").
362.
Id. at 144.
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countries, or LDCs] are in Africa. '363 NTBs, especially technical
standards, can pose three challenges to LDCs, most of which are in
Africa. First, "LDCs lack the capacity to regulate based [on] technical
standards, which means that their markets are less protected by
NTBs than countries with such capacity. '364 Second, "LDCs have less
capacity to comply with NTBs imposed by other countries. This
means that the actual barriers imposed by NTBs are effectively more
binding for LDCs, where the capacity is weaker than for other
countries where the capacity is high. ' 36 5 Third, "a disproportionately

large part of LDCs' exports face NTBs due to their concentration on
agricultural exports, where the majority of NTBs lie. For African
LDCs, the cost of NTBs can be extremely high relative to the[] small
size of their economies." 36 6 African leaders must be vigilant to
and ensure that China keeps its
monitor Chinese market conditions
367
promise of greater market access.
2.

Disaggregated Data

Because Africa is not homogenous, the relationship between the
continent and China is bound to have a disparate impact on different
countries in Africa. 368 In general, although the gains from SouthSouth trade and investment cooperation have been celebrated, not all
countries have benefitted. 369 Instead of broad speculations and
generalizations, efforts must be made to identify the impact of SinoAfrican trade on the different countries in Africa and on different
groups within each country. It is important to have a clear picture of
the winners and losers in this unfolding relationship, not only as

363.
Id. at 145. The World Bank also notes that "NTBs are . . . present in
African industries where protection of domestic businesses from import surges is
sought." Id.
364.
Id. at 146.
365.
Id.
Id.
366.
367.
See id. at 134 (noting that China has plans to further lower its tariffs and
bring about lower dispersions in the structure of tariffs by the end of 2007).
See Sidiropoulos, supra note 11, at 103 ("[Tlhere can be no single blueprint
368.
that can help all African countries rise to the challenges that China presents.").
According to Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD:
369.
The United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation is an appropriate
occasion to celebrate the good news about the rise of the South . ..
Unfortunately, as we know too well, the good news does not apply to developing
countries or regions across the board; many of the most vulnerable countries
are worse off today than ever. Income disparities between and within countries
is growing, and in many nations the international development goals are
unlikely to be met."
Panitchpakdi, supra note 69.
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between countries in Africa, but also as between groups within a
country.
With China's interest concentrated in the energy sector and raw
materials, the winners are likely to be countries endowed with oil,
natural gas, and other raw materials. The losers are likely to be
countries that are poor in natural resources. Not only will these
countries not benefit from increased trade with China, they are likely
to suffer the effect of an increase in global commodity prices brought
about by China's economic expansion. FDI in Africa has traditionally
been concentrated geographically and industrially.3 70
A large
proportion of Africa's FDI inflow is concentrated in mining,
particularly in oil and gas. 371 The result is that only five countriesSouth Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco, and Sudan-account for 66%
of Africa's FDI inflow. 372 Export trade is also geographically and
industrially concentrated. 373 "Five oil- and mineral-exporting
countries account for 85[%] of Africa's exports to China. '3 74 As the
second largest oil producer in Africa today, Angola is China's most
important trading partner on the continent.3 75 Angola became the
largest supplier of crude oil to China in February 2006, surpassing
Saudi Arabia (second place) and Iran (third place).3 76 In sum, LDCs
will probably benefit the least as a result of limited natural resources,
political instability, and lack of diversification into the manufacturing
377
sector.
Within these countries, the winners are likely to be the urban
rich who can afford the manufactured goods from China that are
flooding the continent. 378 Those who control the energy sector are
also likely to benefit from FDI inflows from China. 379 Local producers

370.
World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 41.
371.
Id. at 40.
372.
Id. at 41, fig. 11.4. According to the World Investment Report 2006, South
Africa registered the largest inflows taking about 21% of the region's total. Other
leading recipients of FDI inflows in Africa include: Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria,
Tunisia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Id.
373.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 12 ("The current geographic distribution of
Africa's origin markets for the continent's export to China and India is concentrated.").
374.
Id. at 9.
375.
Chinese Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., China's Portuguese Connection,
Sept. 26, 2006, http:/Ibig5.mofcom.gov.cn/gatebig5/english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject
chinaportuguese/ lanmub/200609/20060903270793.html.
376.
Id.
377.
World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 42 (observing that LDCs
received the least FDI in Africa).
378.
MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM, supra note 229, at 48-49 (noting that
Chinese consumer goods are flooding African markets, thus raising concerns about the
effect on local industries).
379.
See id. at 52 (noting that China is reaching out to U.S. oil companies to
assist with deep water oil exploration off the coast of Equitorial Guinea).

568

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 41.-505

and manufacturers are likely to lose as a result of increased
38 0
competition from China.
3.

Interrogate Reciprocity

Will Africa actually benefit from trade and investment relations
with China? How would deepened relationships affect domestic
industries and employment trends on the continent? While Asian
firms are increasingly establishing businesses in Africa, FDI in Asia
38 1
by African firms is negligible, both in relative and absolute terms.
It is unlikely that African corporations will invest in China in the
short- to medium-term. 38 2 FDI outflow from Africa is negligible
compared to overall global FDI outflow. 38 3 Worse, outward FDI from
Africa is in decline. 38 4 Africa's FDI in China is thus likely to be
negligible. 385 Although China attracts the most foreign direct
investment among developing counties, Africa is not enjoying the
windfall. 38 6
Only South African corporations are likely to
contemplate investing in China. 38 7
Other countries that could

380.
See id. at 49 (suggesting that Chinese textile exports to Africa are
undermining the local industry in countries such as South Africa and Nigeria).
381.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 12 ("While there is some African FDI in
China and India, this investment is dominated by the flows of Chinese and Indian FDI
in Africa.").
382.
See id. at 13 (suggesting that China's strict import policies and high tariff
rates make it difficult for African companies to import their goods to China).
383.
See World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 45 ("FDI outflows from
Africa were a minuscule proportion of global outflows-0.1%-and only 0.9% of
developing-country outflows.").
384.
Id. at 44 (observing that outward FDI from Africa fell to $1.1 billion from
$1.9 billion).
385.
African countries do not feature in the list of top ten countries investing in
China. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce,
In January 2007, the top 10 counties [sic]/regions[ten] countries/regions
that invested in China are: Hong Kong (1.677 billion USD), British Virgin
Islands (1.019 billion USD), South Korea (396,000,000 USD), Japan
(323,000,000 USD), Singapore (246,000,000 USD), U.S.U[nited] S[tates]
(236,000,000 USD), Mauritius (191,000,000 USD), Taiwan (136,000,000 USD),
Cayman islands (134,000,000 USD), and Samoa (117,000,000 USD), which
accounted for 86.62% of China's total actual foreign investment."
Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., China Attracted 5.175 Bln USD of FDIin January
2007, Feb. 16, 2007, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/significantnews/
200702/20070204389692.html.
386.
See Ministry of Commerce of the P.R.C., Foreign Direct Investment in
China Reached No.4 Worldwide in 2006, Jan. 25, 2007, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn
aarticle/newsreleasesignificantnews20070120070104311875.html
("Foreign capital
inflow in Africa was focused on petroleum exploration and refining industries.").
387.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 12 (observing that while there is some
African foreign direct investment in China, this investment is dominated by the flows
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possibly benefit from the investment opportunities in China are
Nigeria, Liberia, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt; together with South
388
Africa, these countries account for 81% of Africa's FDI outflow.
Regarding trade, Africa's exports to Asia represent only about 1.6% of
38 9
the worldwide exports to Asia.
Despite the rhetoric of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation,
competition between African and Chinese producers is a major source
of concern for producers and manufacturers in Africa. According to
the World Bank, "the rise of internationally competitive Chinese and
Indian businesses has displaced domestic sales as well as exports
from African producers, such as textile and apparel firms, whether
through investments by Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs on the
Sub-Saharan continent or through exports from their home
markets. '390 Furthermore, "Sectors such as agriculture and food,
machinery, non-durable, non-construction services, and textiles
appear to face tougher competition from China and India than do
other sectors." 39 1 Is Africa able to produce tradable, internationally
competitive goods and services? 392 The forecast is grim. According to
the World Bank,
Most African nations . . . possess a rather thin base of internationally
competitive private sector enterprise and the related institutions and
infrastructure needed for them to be able to engage in sustainable and
commercially attractive international transactions.
Under these
conditions,... there would be limited or perhaps no supply response to
any beneficial reform in trade and investment policies that might
393
materialize.

African leaders must adopt clear policies in response to competitive
pressure from China and other countries in Asia. This does not
necessarily call for protectionism. 394 Competition will likely affect
the profitability and future viability of firms in Africa and presents
grave survival and unemployment threats. 395 At the very least,
governments in Africa must create enabling environments for the
domestic private sector and adopt policies to protect those that will be
affected by the competition.

of Chinese FDI in Africa); World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 40 (noting that
Africa's outward investors are primarily from South Africa).
388.
World Investment Report, supra note 71, at 45.
389.
BROADMAIN, supranote 2, at 3.
390.
Id.
391.
Id. at 203.
392.
See id. at 13 (observing that in order for trade to take place, tradable goods
and services must be produced).
393.
Id. at 13-14.
394.
Undoubtedly, import competition can have some positive effects.effect.
First, it could motivate firms in Africa to effectively differentiate their products in
order to capture a market niche. Second, competitive pressure from import competition
could motivate the private sector in Africa to be more internationally competitive.
395.
BROADMAN, supranote 2, at 204.
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Maximizing Opportunities, Addressing Supply-Side Constraints

African leaders must effectively address the supply-side
constraints to trade. 396 Africa cannot benefit from trade with China
unless the continent is able to produce competitive goods for export
and actively identify where markets exist for these products in China.
Presently, "African producers do not effectively capture the benefit of
low tariffs for some products in Asian markets due to a lack of
production capacity. '39 7 Indeed, Chinese preferential tariffs for
African LDCs have so far been underused. 398 According to the World
Bank, Africa's exports under the existing preferential tariff accounts
for only 25% of total exports from LDCs in Africa. 399 The need to
address supply-side constraints is particularly strong in the
agricultural sector because the agrarian systems in the continent are
presently weak and unproductive. 400
Within the framework of
NEPAD, African leaders have resolved to "improve access to, and
affordability and reliability of, infrastructure services for both firms
and households."'40 1 To this end, they resolved to increase investment
in infrastructure and improve system maintenance that will sustain
infrastructure. 40 2 These are welcomed plans that should be fully
implemented.

396.

According to the NEPAD Framework document:

If Africa had the same basic infrastructure as developed countries, it would be
in a more favorable position to focus on production and on improving
productivity for international competition. The structural gap in infrastructure
constitutes a very serious handicap to economic growth and poverty reduction.
Improved infrastructure, including the cost and reliability of services, would
benefit both Africa and the International Community, which would be able to
obtain African goods and services more cheaply.
NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302, 98.
397.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 137 (citing the example of cotton yarn in
China, and noting that although the tariff on cotton yarn is relatively low in
comparison to the tariff on cotton, African countries have not been able to take
advantage of low tariffs on cotton products).
398.
Id. at 170. (" In 2004, African LDCs actually exported products that
correspond to only 72 of the 190 lines with zero tariffs.").
399.
Id.
400.
See NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302,
130 ("Improvement
in agricultural performance is a prerequisite of economic development on the continent.
The resulting increase in rural people's purchasing power will also lead to higher
effective demand for African industrial goods. The induced dynamics would constitute
a significant source of economic growth.").
401.
Id. $ 102.
402.
Id. 97.
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Private Sector-Led Relationships

40 3
The private sector is a stakeholder in Africa's development.
Africa will benefit from Sino-African trade to the extent that the
continent has a strong, vibrant private sector able to engage in trade
with China and equipped to access and compete for market openings
in China. 40 4 The relationship between governments and businesses
in Africa must be reassessed and strengthened. The communication
channel between governments and the private sector should be open
and transparent. The quality of information governments are able to
provide to businesses in Africa about market conditions in China
should be reviewed. Do states in Africa provide timely and regular
reports on the trade and investment climate in China that could
enable the private sector to have better knowledge of China's trade
Are there opportunities for African
regimes and practices?
businesses to report market barrier problems to governments in
Africa in a timely fashion? Are governments able to follow-up on
complaints when they are made? China is definitely ahead in this
regard. Since 2003, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has
published the Foreign Market Access Report (FMA Report)
annually.40 5 The stated goal of the FMA Report is to

[enable] Chinese enterprises and relevant organizations to have better
knowledge [of] the trade regimes and practices of China's trading
partners in the field of trade in goods and services as well as foreign
investment, to obtain a full-scaled understanding of competition on
[the] global market, and thus to participate in the international
406
competition on an even ground.

The FMA Report also serves as a vehicle for "expressing the concerns
of the Chinese government and industries over the external
environment for trade development. '40 7 The 2005 Report covered
twenty-two trading partners of China, including Egypt, South Africa,
and Nigeria. 408 For each trading partner, the Report presented

56 (issuing a request from the African leaders that "the African
See id.
403.
people take up the challenge of mobilizing support for the implementation of the
NEPAD initiative by setting up, at all levels, structures for organization, mobilization
and action").
404.
See United Nations, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, Private Sector,
http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/privatesector.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) ("A vibrant
domestic private sector promises to be a virtuous link in the cycle of improving the
competitiveness of African economies, signaling the existence of an enabling
environment for business, and attracting foreign investment, which in turn
strengthens international competitiveness of African economies.").
The Foreign Market Access Report is published pursuant to the Foreign
405.
Trade Law and the Regulations on Administration of Import and Export of Goods. See
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE P.R.C., FOREIGN MARKET ACCESS REPORT 2005 (2005).
Id. at 2.
406.
Id.
407.
Id. at 3.
408.
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information on three main areas: bilateral economic and trade
development, trade and investment regulatory regime, and barriers
40 9
to trade and investment.
There are interesting developments on the horizon. Within the
context of NEPAD, the private sector is expected to play a significant
role in the future. 4 10 There are also new initiatives aimed at
fostering private-public partnership. 4 11 In NEPAD's framework
document, African leaders acknowledge that "[p]rivate enterprise
must be supported. '4 12 Under the framework, private enterprise
includes "both micro-enterprises in the informal sector and small and
medium enterprise in the manufacturing sector, which are principle
engines of growth and development.' 413 The framework calls upon
governments to "remove constraints on business activity and
encourage the creative talents of African entrepreneurs. 4 1 4
6.

Enabling Environment for Trade and Investment

For Africa to benefit from trade and investment relations,
governments must improve the business environment on the
continent. 415 Businesses, domestic and foreign, face many obstacles
in Africa, including excessive regulation, lack of transparency and
practices. 416
corruption, and anti-competitive
predictability,
Domestic and foreign firms lose millions due to corruption, red tape,

409.
Id. at 4.
410.
See Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, Report on the Ad Hoc Expert
Group Meeting on the Contributions of the Private Sector to the Implementation of the
New Partnership for Africa's Development 1 (2005), available at http://www.un.org/
africa/osaa/reportsfMidrand%20WorkShop%20Report%2OContribution%20of%2Othe%2
OPte%20Sector.pdf (observing that the private sector's role in NEPAD is critical and its
importance "well acknowledged both by the leaders of African countries and by the
private sector itself').
411.
In 2005, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa of the UN Secretariat, in
collaboration with the NEPAD Secretariat, organized an expert group meeting on the
theme "The Contribution of the Private Sector in the Implementation of NEPAD." Id.
412.
NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302, 153.
413.
Id.
414.
Id.
415.
According to Hilary Benn MP, the Secretary of State for International
Development in the U.K.:
If Africa is to achieve the 7% growth necessary to meet the key MDG of halving
the number of people in poverty by 2015, the business environment must
improve. . . . [T]here is the perception that Africa's security, health and
infrastructure problems mean it is a poor place to do business."
Press Release, Dept. for Int'l Dev., Africa Opening for Business: Prime Minister
Confirms UK Support for Africa's Investment Climate Facility (ICF) (Nov. 17, 2005),
available at http:f/www.dfid.gov.uklnewslfiles/pressreleases/investment-chmate-facility.asp.
416.
Id.
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and regulatory uncertainty. 417 Presently, "many countries [in Africa]
lack the policy and regulatory frameworks for private-sector growth,"
as well as the "capacity to implement programs. '4 18 According to
Cohen and Alasa, key obstacles to foreign investment fall into three
main categories: legal regimes and regulatory certainty, 419 lack 42of1
property rights, 420 and political instability and corruption.
Corruption in Africa is legendary. African countries also ranked low
in the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom, published by The Heritage
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, in terms of protecting
4 22
property rights.
The establishment of the Investment Climate Facility for Africa
(ICF) is a step in the right direction.
A new private-public
partnership, the ICF is focused on improving Africa's investment
climate. 423 ICF's mission is "to make Africa an even better place to do
business, by removing obstacles to domestic and foreign investment
424
and by promoting Africa as an attractive investment destination."
Important African institutions, major donor agencies, and key private
sector interests have all endorsed ICF. 425 ICF is set up to support

417.
See South Africa Industry: Undermined, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT,
Nov. 17, 2006 (citing a survey by the South African Chamber of Mines that found that
red tape and regulatory uncertainty cost the mining sector 5 billion to 10 billion Rand
($0.7 billion-$1.4 billion) per year in lost investment).
418.
NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302, 86.
419.
According to Cohen & Alasa, "Africa is one of the world's most difficult
places to do business. In many African oil-producing countries, investors face arbitrary
or nonexistent law enforcement, selective and stifling taxation, conflicting legal codes,
high transaction costs, shoddy infrastructure, and pervasive corruption." Cohen &
Alasa, supra note 17, at 3.
420.
Id. at 4 (noting that property rights are the first institution that should be
strengthened in Africa and calling for "clearly written and well-enforced land and
mineral rights laws," as these form the "bedrock for economic development and help to
attract foreign investment").
421.
In an indicting critique, Cohen and Alasa assert:
Doing business in Africa requires facing significant political risks, including
coups, ethnic strife, resource battles, and unstable transfers of power.
Investment in the energy sector incurs even greater risks because of large
initial capital costs and longer time horizons. If a new regime takes power and
expropriates a multibillion-dollar project without paying full and fair
compensation, investors can lose their entire investment.
Id. at 3.
422. The 2007 Index of Economic Freedom measured and ranked 161 countries
across ten specific freedoms: labour freedom, business freedom, trade freedom,
monetary freedom, financial freedom, freedom from government, freedom from
corruption, fiscal freedom, property rights, and investment freedom.
See 2007 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM (Wall St. J. & Heritage Found. eds., 2007).
423.
The Investment Climate Facility for Africa, Welcome: ICF Mission,
http://www.investmentclimatefacility.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
424.
Id.
425.
The
Investment
Climate
Facility
for
Africa,
Supporters,
http://www.investmentclimatefacility.org/supporters.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
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"appropriately
targeted
practical
interventions"
and
to
"systematically focus on areas where practical steps can be taken to
remove identified constraints and problems. '4 26 With the goal of
enhancing the quality of economic and public financial management
as well as corporate governance, African leaders agreed in 2001 to
create a Task Force "to review economic and corporate governance
practices in the various countries and regions, and to make
recommendations on appropriate standards and codes of good
427
practices."
7.

Respect for Human Rights

The impact of Sino-African trade and investment on human
rights cannot be ignored. Critics of China's engagement in Africa are
concerned that profit will be placed over principle. 428 Sticking points
include China's dubious stance on the Darfur crisis, 429 China's arms

426.
The Investment Climate Facility for Africa's website explains the objectives
of the Facility. Facility: At the initial phase, ICF operations will be driven by three
strategic themes: intra-African trade, facilitation of business development, and
expansion and facilitation of financial and investment environment. The Investment
Climate Facility for Africa, About Us, http://www.investmentclimatefacility.org
about.htm#icfinbrief (last visited Jan. 20, 2008). Regarding intra-African trade, the
emphasis is on "improving Africa's import and export environment and improving and
simplifying administration in order to facilitate cross-border trade." Id. With respect
to facilitation of business development and expansion, ICF will focus on "ICF and
infrastructure development, business registration and licensing and property rights."
Id. Finally, regarding facilitation of financial and investment environment, the
emphasis will be on "developing capital markets, increasing access to finance for
enterprises, improving the regulatory environment for second and third tier
institutions and facilitating improved digital infrastructure." Id.
427.
NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302, 89.
428.
For a critical discussion of China's willingness to trade principle for profit,
see Brad Adams & Peter Takirambudde, Letter to China on the Crisis in Darfur,Jan.
29, 2007, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007101/29/sudanl5l89.htm ("Chinese
oil companies have frequently been operating in areas where communities complain of
a wide range of abuses.").
429.
In an open letter to China's president on January 29, 2007, Brad Adams
(Executive Director of Asia Watch) and Peter Takirambudde (Executive Director of
Africa Watch) urged China to use its influence to end the conflict in Darfur and to use
the revenue from the Sudanese oil for the benefit of the poor. Id.
In the January 29 letter, the authors urged China to "seriously consider the
important step of supporting through the UN the imposition of targeted sanctions on
key Sudanese officials responsible for Darfur policy," "in cooperation with other
Security Council members, authoriz[ing] the establishment of a United Nationsadministered trust fund for the victims of atrocities," "establish[ing] new mechanisms
to monitor the end-use of its weapons," "examin[ing] the connection between Sudanese
oil development and human rights abuses," and "issu[ing] an overview or white paper
on China's policies toward the Sudan over the past decade." Id.
The authors recommended sanctions, including freezing assets as well as travel
restrictions applied to the Sudanese Minister of Defence and other high-level officials.
Id. In requesting increased Chinese support for UN efforts in Sudan, Adams and
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sales to regimes in Africa, 43 0 and China's friendship with leaders that
Western governments seek to isolate, such as Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe. 431 Critics see China as the major stumbling block to U.S.
efforts to impose economic and military sanctions on countries such
43 2
as Sudan, Myanmar, and Iran.
Any claims of friendship made by China with respect to the
African people will ring hollow if the Chinese government does not
use its leverage to address human rights abuses on the continent.
With its engagement in Africa, China has a fresh opportunity to
prove that it can be a responsible international power.43 3 Efforts to
cast talk of democracy and human rights as a tool of anti-imperialism
ignores internal pressure for reform in Africa. Human rights and
respect for the rule of law can and should be strong components of
South-South cooperation. 434 Chinese and African leaders must not
let the spirit of the Bandung Conference die. Arguably, the Bandung

Takirambudde called attention to the fact that China has recently supported the
imposition of sanctions elsewhere. Id. They note:
China has recently publicly supported sanctions against Iran and imposed
lesser restrictions on North Korea for their nuclear activities. The crisis in
Sudan is no less critical, either for its victims in Darfur or for the millions of
civilians living in the region who now face threats to their lives and livelihoods
because of the regional instability caused by Darfur's conflict. Millions of
civilians face this nightmare because of the Sudanese government's policies of
supporting abusive armed groups both within Sudan and across Sudan's
borders. China can demonstrate its support for regional peace and security by
publicly calling for an end to abusive domestic and foreign policies.

Id.
430.
Brookes & Shin, supra note 248, at 4 (observing that African dictators "are
regular buyers of Chinese weapons and military equipment, which they often use to
oppress minority populations, quash political opposition, harass neighboring countries,
and extinguish any glimmers of democratization").
431.
See id. at 1 (observing that China "aids and abets oppressive and destitute
African dictatorships by legitimizing their misguided policies and praising their
development models as suited to individual national conditions").
432.
See, e.g., Thalif Deen, How to Curb China's Arms Trade, ASIA TIMES, June
14, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF14AdOl.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
With the threat of its veto, China has expressed strong reservations over recent
Western attempts either to penalize or impose sanctions against Sudan,
Myanmar and Iran for various political reasons. Nor has the 15-member
Security Council been able to take any action against any of the three countries
because of opposition from China or Russia-or both.").
433.
See Drew Thompson, Economic Growth and Soft Power.- China's Africa
Strategy, CHINA BRIEF, Dec. 7, 2004, at 1, 3 (noting that China "has an opportunity to
fulfill its aspirations as a 'responsible power' through cooperating with the
international community to help promote security and stability in the region").
434.
Katzenellenbogen, supra note 1 ("If and when China takes on a more active
political reform, it is likely that elements of its Africa policy might also change to give
human rights and governance more emphasis.").
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Conference was much more than an anti-colonial and anti-Western
forum. Indeed, the leaders that gathered in Bandung in 1955
435
considered the achievement of respect for human rights important.
Principle 1 of the Bandung Conference called for respect for
fundamental human rights as set forth in the United Nations
Charter. 43 6 In the Doha Declaration, adopted by the Group of 77 and
China following the Second South Summit in 2005, leaders of
developing countries acknowledged that "good governance and the
rule of law at the national and international levels are essential for
sustained economic growth, sustainable development, and eradication
of poverty and hunger," and that "sound economic policies, solid
democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people, [and]
respect for all human rights... should also be pursued. '43 7 Moreover,
as world leaders rightly noted in the Monterrey Consensus adopted at
the Conference on Financing for Development that
[g]ood governance is essential for sustainable development. Sound
economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs
of the people[,] and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained
economic growth, poverty eradication[,] and employment creation.
Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human
rights, including the right to development, and the rule of law, gender
equality, market-oriented policies, and an overall commitment to just
43 8
and democratic societies are ... essential and mutually reinforcing.

The place of human rights in China's Africa policy is vague at best.
Even while asserting that "[t]he universality of human rights and
fundamental freedoms should be respected," the Beijing Declaration
of 2000 goes on to state that "[c]ountries, that vary from one another
in social system, development level, historical and cultural
background and values, have the right to choose their own approaches
and models in promoting and protecting human rights in their own
countries."439 The Declaration further asserts that "the politicization
of human rights and the human rights conditionalities on economic
assistance should be vigorously opposed as violation[s] of human
rights." 440 While African dictators undoubtedly welcome such claims,
they are troubling to human rights groups in Africa, most of whom
have pushed for human rights conditionalities in economic
assistance. 441 Such statements fuel the speculation that China's

435.
Bandung Conference, supra note 33, at 6.
436.
Id.
437.
Doha Declaration, supra note 52, 10.
438.
Monterrey Consensus, supranote 77, 1 11
439.
Beijing Declaration of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, supra note 5
(emphasis added).
440.
Id.
441.
See, e.g., Adams & Takirambudde, supra note 428 (suggesting that the
Security Council require the Sudanese governmentGovernment of Sudan to contribute
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Africa policy is intended to benefit the corrupt elites rather than the
masses, and that the policy "grants [to] the elites of each country the
[power to be the] arbiters of what are or what are not 'human rights'
and also [to determine] how such rights should be protected (or not as
the case may be)." 442 Within the context of NEPAD, African leaders
have resolved to take "joint responsibility" for "[p]romoting and
protecting democracy and human rights in their respective countries
and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability,
transparency[,] and participatory governance at the national and
subnational levels,"44 3 and for "[i]nstituting transparent legal and
regulatory frameworks for financial markets and the auditing of
private companies and the public sector. '444 The time for action is
now.
8.

Examining Readiness

Will the continent only be a source of cheap raw materials for
China and a dumping ground for Chinese goods? Do African leaders
have the will and capacity to protect their people from exploitation
and abuse? Is Africa really ready to do business with China, or will
history repeat itself? Although China likes to cast itself as a
developing country and readily draws on a shared history of
colonization and domination, China is a well-crafted, sophisticated
economy, at least compared to economies in Africa. Dumping is
already a problem and is likely to grow. 445 Regarding readiness,
several questions may be asked:
"

Do African countries have the institutional capability and
expertise to initiate anti-dumping, countervailing, productspecific safeguard investigations against Chinese exporters if
necessary? From 1995 to the first half of 2004, WTO members
initiated 2,537 anti-dumping cases, 356 (or one-seventh) of which
involved Chinese products.

"

Do states in Africa have information in place to help domestic
companies and organizations learn the investment systems and
practices of China and understand barriers to trade and
investment so that those African companies and organizations

to a trust fund to help support ongoing humanitarian assistance to the region, and
urging China to support such measures).
442.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 69
443.
NEPAD Framework Document, supranote 302, 49.
444.
Id.
445.
Dulue Mbachu, Nigerian Resources: Changingthe Playing Field, 13 S. AFR.
J. INT'L AFF. 77, 80 (2006) ("Chinese exporters have been accused of dumping goods,
particularly textiles, in Nigeria.").
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on

equal

"

Do states have a technical trade-barrier warning system that can
alert African exporters and investors of potential problems in
447
China and other countries?

"

Do states in Africa have the expertise and resources to trace and
detect counterfeit or adulterated goods imported 448into the
continent, particularly harmful food and drug imports?

*

Do states in Africa have the capability to monitor human rights
and
conditions in Chinese-run and other foreign-run businesses
449
the willingness to enforce appropriate labor standards?

See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
446.
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 57-95 (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov
assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2004/2004_National_TradeEstimate/2
(explaining China's barriers to
004 NTE_Report/asseLupload-file2l8_4743.pdf
international trade).
447.
China to Set Up Technical Trade Barrier Warning System, PEOPLE'S DAILY
(P.R.C.), Jan. 14, 2005, http://english.people.com.cn/200501/14/eng2OO5Oll4_170704.html.
448.
See Mbachu, supra note 445, at 80 (noting that the influx of Chinese goods
into Nigeria has generated complaints of unfair trading practices, including the
In Nigeria, Asian
dumping of fake and substandard goods into the country).
companies, displaced by enforcement action in countries such as China and Taiwan,
are finding "greener" pastures in Nigeria and other Third World countries with weaker
or nonexistent enforcement apparatuses.apparatus. For a discussion of the influx of
Chinese business and the accompanying enforcement problems, see Kunle Aderinokun,
Foreign Investments in Nigeria Hit $35bn, THIS DAY (Nig.), Aug. 20, 2007, available at
In 1995, Akina, a company
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=86827.2007.
reportedly owned and operated by some Chinese merchants, was barred from illegal
mass reproduction of copyright products by the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC).
See Chinese Firm Sealed Up for Piracy, THIS DAY (Nig.), June 11, 2005, available at
Surprisingly, the same
http://www.thisdayonline.comlnview.php?id=19789.2005.
company had been sanctioned the previous year for illegal operation. However,
unknown to authorities, the company continued to produce pirated copies under a new
name: Kwangwang Nigeria Limited. Id.
In Mozambique, a Chinese-owned company was allegedly paying
449.
Mozambicans below minimum wage, but cooked up the wage sheet sent to the
Provincial Labour Directorate to avoid detection. See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 104
(noting that "in December 2005, it was alleged" that a Chinese-owned timber company
in Mozambique "was paying its Mozambican workers wages that were below the
statutory minimum wage"). In 2005, it was alleged that a Chinese-owned timber
company in Mozambique was paying Mozambican workers wages that were below the
mandated minimum wage. However, in order to evade Mozambican labor laws, the
owners of the company produced two wage sheets every month. Id. According to the
Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique:
On one of these sheets, the one sent to the Provincial Labour Directorate, every
thing appears to be legal. . . . But the sheets sent to the Directorate are
phoney, and bear forged signatures.... [W]hen [a] correspondent went to the
company and spoke to the workers, he found that they had not been paid for
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China cannot be singled out for special or heightened scrutiny.
The questions are pertinent in all dealings between Africa and its
trading partners. Trade between China and Africa will be shaped by
the terms of any future trade and investment treaties that the two
sides conclude, rather than by promises made at high diplomatic
meetings. Although FTAs have proliferated in recent times, 450 none
exist between China and any country or group of countries in
Africa. 451 There is, however, a FTA currently under negotiation
between China and South Africa. 452
Presently, multilateral
commitments under the WTO govern trade between China and most
countries in Africa. 453 In the Africa Policy Paper, China stated that
"[w]hen conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional
organizations. ''454 With respect to bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), although China has signed BITs with many countries in
Africa, 455 the terms of most of the treaties are not generally public.

VII. CONCLUSION

The global economy and the global balance of power both have to
be seriously reconsidered in light of China's ascendance in the
twenty-first century.4 56 Experts project that China will become the
world's largest economy in 2027 if it stays on the same economic

December, and were unsure whether they would be paid before the end of the
year.... [A] second wage sheet, not shown to the Directorate, contains the real
wages.
Id. (citing an Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique report).
450.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 165 (noting that FTAs and RTAs "have
proliferated around the world," and that since June 2006, "197 RTAs have been filed
with the WTO.").
451.
Id. at 165-66 (observing that agreements between countries in Africa and
Asia are "very limited in number").
452.
China, South Africa to Launch Free Trade Talks, CHINA DAILY, July 1,
2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004.07/01/content_344575.htm.
453.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 166-67 ("[T]he basic contours of trade
between Africa and China ... are still subject to WTO rules and standards, including
procedures for dispute settlement.").
454.
Chinese Government Official Web Portal, China's African Policy,
http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006.01/12/content_156490.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
455.
See BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 158 (indicating that China is "among the
top 10 developing countries that have signed the most BITs ... with other developing
countries" and that "China has by far the most BITs with other African countries.").
456.
See Mbeki, supra note 350 ("China's developmental trajectory is forcing
both the developed and the developing world to think differently about the global
economy and the global balance of power.").
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track.4 57 Clearly, "South-South cooperation is changing the landscape

of international relations. '458 As Mr. Anwarul K. Chowdury (United
Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for the
Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Countries, and Small Island
Developing States) has rightly noted, "Historically, developing
countries tended to look to the North for trade, investment[,] and
other development opportunities. In the last decade ... it has become

clear that increased interaction among countries of the South can
'459
bring immense economic and social benefits.
Developed and developing countries alike have to rethink their
relations with China. In light of the fact that barely thirty years ago,
"China's per capita income was a mere 7.5% of Western Europe's,"
but "by 2000, it had reached around 20% of Europe's per capita
income," there is a lot Africa could learn from China. 460 For one
thing, Africa could learn from China's success in reducing extreme
poverty in the last three decades. 4 61 In contrast to China, the
number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa over the past
462
three decades has steadily risen.
In assessing Sino-African trade and investment relations, it is
necessary to go beyond grand rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of
anti-hegemonism and mutual support. China must be judged by its
deeds and not by its words. 463 Trade deficits and unbalanced terms of
trade should be a big cause for concern for African leaders. Trade
between China and Africa has traditionally been unbalanced in

457.
William Foreman, China's Influence Spreads Around the World, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dynlcontent/
article/2007/09/011AR2007090100638.html.
458.
Anwarul Chowdhury, Under-Sec'y-General and High Rep. for the Least
Developed Countries, Landlocked Countries and Small Island Developing States,
Celebrating the Global South: Diversity and Creativity, Address before the Trusteeship
Council (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/special-replohrlls/Statements/
19%20Dec%2005%20-%20South-South%20Cooperation.pdf.
459.
Id.
460.
Mbeki, supra note 350.
461.
See id. (noting China's impressive record on poverty reduction: "In 1981
about 64% of the Chinese population lived on less than one dollar a day. By 2001 this
had been reduced to 17%.").
462.
See id. (indicating that poverty in Africa is rising, and today, "[ailmost half
of Africa's population is considered to be living below the poverty line of one dollar a
day.").
463.
In 1956, John Cooley aptly warned that
the overblown, verbose propaganda world of "paper tigers" and "armed
struggle" is colorful and often effective. But neither Africans nor anyone else
should allow it to obscure the often cautious and prudent nature of what the
Chinese actually do in a given situation, as opposed to what they say about it.
Chinese words in Africa have spoken louder than Chinese actions.
COOLEY, supra note 23, at 219.
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China's favor, 46 4 and this trend continues. In the Declaration of the
Beijing Summit, the two sides merely noted "the necessity to move
towards balanced and enhanced trade" and acknowledged "the need
to assist in improving the production capacity in Africa and in
diversifying the composition of African exports. '465 While "[n]oting
with concern the imbalance in the two-way trade and the need to
address it as soon as possible," China merely promised, among other
things, to "encourage its enterprises to give preference to the import
'466
of African products in the light of market demand and conditions.
Colonialism wreaked havoc on the economies of African states.
Unfortunately, "failures of political and economic leadership in many
African countriesimpede" economic development today. 467 Respect
for human rights, transparency, and private sector participation must
constitute the foundation for unfolding Sino-African trade relations.
African leaders must ensure that China-Africa trade and investment
relations do not undermine their renewed commitment to promote
democracy and human rights and to institute transparent legal and
regulatory frameworks on the continent.
Although China may have "effectively ended Western
dominance" of economies in Africa, 468 Africa should not hastily part
ways with its traditional Western trading powers for several reasons.
First, much about China's relationship with Africa is still grounded in
unenforceable promises. Only time will tell if China will keep its
promises and if the arrangement will be mutually beneficial to all.
Second, there is no guarantee that China will remain in Africa in the
long-term. China may lose interest in the continent, as it has done in
the past, if its economic expectations are not met. 469 As Taylor

464.
TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 71 ("Traditionally, Sino-African trade has been
vastly unbalanced in China's Favour.").
465.
Declaration of the Beijing Summit, supra note 91, 4.1.
466.
Id. 4.4.
467.
NEPAD Framework Document, supra note 302,
34 ("At the same time,
we recognize that failures of political and economic leadership in many African
countries impede the effective mobilization and utilization of scarce resources into
productive areas of activity in order to attract and facilitate domestic and foreign
investment.").
468.
Mbachu, supra note 445, at 82 (suggesting that the Chinese "have
effectively ended Western dominance" of Nigeria and that "their presence has resulted
in a change in the country's global relations"); see also World Economic Forum, Trade
Winds:
Chinese Investment
in Africa (Jan. 26,
2006),
available at
http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledgeKNSESSSUMM_16446?urlh/enlknowledge/
KNSESS_SUMM_16446 ("Whether oil in Angola, timber in Mozambique or copper in
Zambia, China is breathing new life into these African economies." (quoting Elizabeth
Economy, Senior Fellow & Dir., Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations)).
469.
From the mid-1980s, China became very preoccupied with internal matters
and with its interactions with Russia and the United States; consequently, it virtually
lost interest in the continent. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 59-60 (noting that "[bly the
mid-1980s it was apparent that China had effectively lost interest in Africa" and
suggesting, as a rationale for the shift, that in China's modernization drive, China
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rightly notes, "China's economic dealings with most African countries
are today based on a cool evaluation of their perceived economic
potentials." 470 In the 1980s, Africa was marginalized by a Beijing
government that was intent on modernization and that came to view
the continent as irrelevant to its modernization quests. 4 71 While
China continued to pay lip-service to such issues as South-South
cooperation, Taylor asserts that "the reality of the situation was that
Beijing's foreign policy was firmly directed towards maintaining and
developing cordial relations with the Superpowers as a means by
472
which China might foster its economic modernization programme."
It was only after the Tiananmen Square debacle that China, shocked
by the depth of Western condemnation, was forced to revive antihegomonic and anti-imperialist rhetoric and to reexamine its foreign
473
policy towards Africa.
Should Africa decide to forge even stronger ties with China,
there will be many challenges in the years ahead. To benefit from
Sino-African trade, knowledge of Chinese legal, social, and political
systems is required. Language barriers could be a problem for
Africans. Today, as in the 1960s, only a handful of Africans speak
Chinese. 4 74 By contrast, the Chinese are unlikely to have problems
communicating with Africans. English and French-the two main
European languages spoken widely in Africa-are increasingly taught
in Chinese schools. 4 75 While some scholars have dismissed as
ridiculous an announcement in 2006 that Zimbabwe's government
hoped to see Mandarin Chinese taught in universities, 4 76 there is

shifted towards Europe, the United States, and Japan, as Africa was perceived as
having very little to offer in terms of trade and strategic needs).
470.
Id. at 71.
471.
Id. at 60-61.
472.
Id. at 60.
See id. at 62 ( noting that the post-Tiananmen era saw China redouble its
473.
effort in southern Africa and continue its anti-hegemonic posturing).
474.
See HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 179-80 (explaining that since very few
Africans spoke Chinese in the 1960s, the Chinese took it upon themselves to learn the
language; this led to a temporary solution of the communications barrier, but also
meant that most African people did not need to expand their knowledge of Chinese
beyond rudimentary words).
475.
See Burton Bollag, The New Latin: English Dominates in Academe, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 2000, at A73, available at http://chronicle.comlweekly/
v47/iO2/02aO7301.htm ("In China, where using English could once could have resulted
in a prison sentence, the language is now on the highly competitive national universityentrance examination. A recent government survey found that 70 percent of urban
Chinese have studied English.").
See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 125 (stating that the Zimbabwean
476.
government does not care about the effect its policies is having on the economy as long
as China offers support and that this "has now reached rather ridiculous lengths, with
the announcement . . . that Zimbabwe's government was hoping to see Mandarin
taught in Universities."); see also Zimbabwe Planning Chinese Lessons, BBC NEWS,
Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhi/africa/4649692.stm (sharing an
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nothing ridiculous or stupid about Africans learning languages that
would help them navigate an increasingly globalized world.
European languages such as English and French are taught in
virtually every university and secondary school in Africa. 477 Racial
discrimination against Africans trying to do business in China may
also be a problem in the future. Early experiments to further the
478
education of Africans in China in the 1960s and 1970s failed.
African students in China reported experiencing racial discrimination
479
and complained about poor facilities and political indoctrination.
Disgruntled students organized protest demonstrations, requested to
48 0
leave China, and even went on hunger strikes.
The present pattern of trade between Africa and China, which
closely mirrors the pattern of trade between African states and
European powers during colonial rule, raises a red flag. Presently,
Africa is exporting only primary commodities to China and is
48
importing manufactured and higher-level products from China. '
Might the relationship motivate African leaders to reevaluate their
economic and development strategies and their trade and investment
agenda? Or is the China-Africa relationship yet another opportunity
for African leaders to line their pockets and their foreign bank
accounts with ill-gotten wealth? Much will depend on the de facto
rules and principles that guide Sino-African relations in the future,
and on how the two sides address the issues of corruption, lack of
transparency and popular participation, accountability, and respect
for human rights.

announcement by Education Minister Stan Mudenge that Zimbabwe would try to
implement Chinese language lessons in their schoo'.).
477.
See Bollag, supra note 475 (indicating that English is the predominant
language of academic life in multiple African countries).
478.
See HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 186-87 (noting that multiple students,
from several countries in the program, reported brutality, racism, and poor education,
and resorted to extreme measures in order to leave China).
479.
In the 1960s and 1970s, African students who had been to China to study
reported experiencing racial discrimination. See, e.g., EMMANUEL HEVI, AN AFRICAN
STUDENT IN CHINA 134-35, 162-70, 183-89 (1964) (recollecting Hevi's own experiences
with racial discrimination during the time he spent studying in China).
480.
HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 187.
481.
BROADMAN, supra note 2, at 8-10.

